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Making the case for a discipline [Book Review from Australian Journalism Review]

By MARK PEARSON

There has been much debate over many years about the place of journalism education in the academy,  whether journalism is even a ‘discipline’ on a par with others, and whether a journalism methodology should be considered ‘academic’ research.

Chris Nash offers a refreshing and thoughtful perspective on these issues in his recent book What is journalism?: The art and politics of a rupture (2016), London, Palgrave MacMillan, which I reviewed for the December 2017 issue of Australian Journalism Review.

Here, I offer the unedited version of that review as submitted.

Making the case for a discipline [Book Review]

Australian Journalism Review
Volume 39 Issue 2 (Dec 2017)

Pearson, Mark (Reviewed by)
Abstract: Review(s) of: What is journalism?: The art and politics of a rupture, by Nash, C. (2016), London, Palgrave MacMillan, ISBN 9781137399335 hbk, 9781137399342 ebk, hbk, ebk, 247pp, $136 hbk, $116 ebk.

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To cite this article: Pearson, Mark. Making the case for a discipline [Book Review] [online]. Australian Journalism Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, Dec 2017: 213-214. Availability: <https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=360615283766665;res=IELLCC&gt; ISSN: 0810-2686. [cited 16 Feb 18].

Personal Author: Pearson, Mark; Source: Australian Journalism Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, Dec 2017: 213-214 Document Type: Journal Article, Book Review ISSN: 0810-2686 Subject: Journalism; Journalistic ethics; Mass media–Social aspects;

 

Nash, C. (2016). What is Journalism? The Art and Politics of a Rupture. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-137-39933-5 hdbk / ISBN 978-1-137-39934-2 ebook; pp. 247; RRP $136 hdbk / $116 ebook

Reviewed by Mark Pearson

Chris Nash reaffirms his place as a leading intellectual in Australian journalism education with this book exploring the theoretical and methodological status of journalism in the academy.

While the main title – What is Journalism? – might be suggestive of an introductory undergraduate text or even a careers guide, the subtitle The Art and Politics of a Rupture establishes Nash’s higher purpose – to develop and map a status for quality journalism as an academic method and discipline in its own right rather than mere fodder for ‘true’ academic disciplines like history, sociology, philosophy and media studies.

“As far as other disciplines are largely concerned, there is no issue to discuss; there is scholarship, there is journalism, and they are different,” Nash writes. “Journalist scholars are being crushed in a glacial silence, caught between the continuing innovations and achievements in professional practice and the wall of resistance in the academic world. The position is untenable. (p. 236).

This is a book targeted at the academy and graduate journalism students, particularly those experienced journalists undertaking doctoral research degrees in journalism.

In a precise yet accessible narrative, Nash centres his argument upon the fulcrum of an epistemological ‘rupture’ – when artist Hans Haacke’s exhibition at New York’s Guggenheim Museum in 1971 was cancelled by the museum director because three of the works were “not art but journalism” – in a “high-profile act of repudiation” (pp. 1 and 203).

Nash juxtaposes this case study (and suspends the question of whether journalism can, in fact, be art) against an analysis of two works of non-fiction by I.F. Stone, regarded as among the greatest journalists of the twentieth century – one critiquing the US role in the Korean War and the other using available artefacts to revisit the events surrounding the ancient Trial of Socrates.

Nash proceeds to elicit frameworks (some presented as conceptual matrices) – drawn from Pierre Bourdieu, David Harvey, Henri Lefebvre, Michel-Rolph Trouillot and Gaye Tuchman – to identify key components of what might constitute journalism, including space, time, social relations and imagination. He treats as methodological challenges journalism’s purported shortcomings as an academically acceptable research output – the elusive notion of ‘news sense’, the focus on a present without context and the unquestioning dependence on powerful establishment sources.

The result is a novel and important contribution to the debate about the constituent components of journalism at its best.

‘News sense’ is that opaque quality, a sixth sense for identifying newsworthiness in a given set of facts that might make it a story – a facility journalists are meant to either possess innately or learn on the job. In Australian journalism education it was so closely identified with what it meant to be a journalist that Adelaide Advertiser cadet trainer Bob Jervis adopted it as the title of his leading craft-oriented journalism textbook in 1985.

Nash elevates this ‘nose for news’ beyond its trade school status by building it into “a theory that validated the reflexivity of what appears to be intuition” and links it to spatiotemporarity (p. 109). To do so, he invokes Bourdieu’s field theory and its incumbent concept of ‘habitus’ as a metatheoretical framework.

As predominantly a media law scholar, I am in awe of Nash’s command of the body of intellectual literature that backgrounds his argument – which he explains in his clear and erudite style and then weaves it meticulously into his model (not a ‘theory’, he insists) of what journalism truly is.

In an era of technologically, economically and culturally disrupted journalism, Nash might have found more room to flesh out the important question of journalistic identity – in both the form of self-identity of those who practice journalism and the acknowledgement of others (peers and audiences) that the work produced is indeed journalism. Self-identity involves journalists’ self-labelling as ‘journalists’ rather than as historians, artists, strategic communicators, PR practitioners or sociologists. It was a crucial distinction between the two main protagonists in his study – Haacke who produced works of ‘journalism’ but who identified as an artist, and Stone who identified as a journalist but produced incisive historical and political analysis yet eschewed the academy.

There are parallels with indigenous identity here – genetics alone are not enough. And this is where peer and audience acceptance plays a role in who might be a journalist and whether the work they produce might be accepted as ‘journalism’, whether or not it meets the Nash criteria for journalism of such a high quality and standard of reflexivity that it might also stand as acceptable academic research.

Linked here is the journalist’s sense of audience, which Nash acknowledges:

This public morality sits well with journalism because a defining element of journalism is its public voice. It is possible for scholars in other disciplines to directly address only one another through academic texts and conference presentations, but journalism must always directly address a notional public and use a public voice. (p. 227).

All of this has practical implications for pragmatic issues like government agencies’ proffering a field of research code to journalism and universities’ acceptance of works of journalism as academic research outputs. In short, Nash has offered tools for such debates with this important addition to the international literature on journalism epistemology, theory and methodology.

The global positioning and application of his thesis is a crucial component of his achievement. It is heartening to see an Australian journalism educator take the world stage with this impressive scholarly contribution.


The review sits within an excellent edition of AJR – the last edited by my esteemed colleague Professor Ian Richards – recently retired from the University of South Australia. A heartfelt welcome to  new editor, Dr Kathryn Bowd from the University of Adelaide.

Here are the contents of Ian’s final edition. I recommend it to you and your libraries for subscription.

Australian Journalism Review

Volume 39 Issue 2 (Dec 2017)

Publisher: Journalism Education AssociationISSN: 0810-2686Publication Type: JournalSubjects: Media; Newspapers; Journalism Coverage: Volume 31, Issue 1 (July 2009) – onwards (Comprehensive)Peer Reviewed: Yes

Database: Literature & Culture Collection

Editorial
Obituaries
Health Journalism
10

Outlining a model of social journalism for health

Sweet, Melissa; Geia, Lynore; Dudgeon, Pat; McCallum, Kerry; Finlay, Summer May; Williams, Megan; McInerney, Marie; Armstrong, Ruth; Doggett, Jennifer; Coopes, Amy; Ward, Mitchell J; Senior, Tim; Ricketson, Matthew

11

#JustJustice: Rewriting the roles of journalism in Indigenous health

Williams, Megan; Finlay, Summer May; Sweet, Melissa; McInerney, Marie

Articles
Emerging Scholars
Book Reviews
22

Cogent account of media influence

Spurgeon, Christina

Contributor Notes
Ethics Statement

 

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

© Mark Pearson 2018

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Public Interest Journalism Committee hears from journalism educators

By MARK PEARSON

The Australian Senate’s  Select Committee on the Future of Public Interest Journalism – known as the ‘Public Interest Journalism Committee’- has heard from several journalism educators in its inquiry into the future of public interest journalism.

Journalism academics have been made several of the 70 submissions to the inquiry and have featured among appearances at the public hearings held to date. It is heartening to see so many of my colleagues lending their considerable expertise to the committee’s deliberations upon the impact of fake news, emerging technologies and other social and economic changes upon the state of public journalism in Australia.

My own submission proposed a new public interest journalism defence which would excuse “legitimate and demonstrated public interest in freedom to communicate on this occasion”. You can read it at my earlier blog post here.

I recently appeared at the Sydney hearing of the committee and my testimony is available here.

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Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

© Mark Pearson 2017

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Submission to Public Interest Journalism Committee calls for new defence to gag laws

By MARK PEARSON

My submission to an Australian parliamentary committee examining the future of journalism proposes a new defence to give genuine public interest journalism a market advantage over fake news, celebrity gossip and other unethical infotainment products.

The Australian Senate established the Select Committee on the Future of Public Interest Journalism – known as the ‘Public Interest Journalism Committee’- on May 10, 2017. The committee is  inquiring into the future of public interest journalism.

The closing date for submissions is June 15, although the committee’s site explains that late submissions will be considered.

Here is my submission.


I hereby offer my personal submission to your committee’s important inquiry into the future of public interest journalism.

My research and expertise includes media and social media law, ethics and regulation. I am lead author of The Journalist’s Guide to Media Law[i], now in its fifth edition, and have been author or editor of numerous other books and scholarly articles and research projects intersecting with your broad terms of reference. My current position is as Professor of Journalism and Social Media at Griffith University as a member of both the Law Futures Centre and the Griffith Centre for Social and Cultural Research. However, this submission represents my own opinions and does not purport to represent the views of my university or of those research centres.

While I have views on several aspects of your inquiry I will restrict this submission to a proposal to amend the media laws and regulations within the direct or indirect control of the Commonwealth Parliament which serve to shackle the enterprise of ‘public interest journalism’ in Australia and ineffectively distinguish it from ‘fake news’[ii] and other misleading, deceptive and sometimes harmful communication products. In summary, I propose that in light of the lack of constitutional protections for public interest journalism in Australia, the Commonwealth should build into every identified restriction on media freedom a “public interest journalism” defence, which would excuse a “legitimate and demonstrated public interest in freedom to communicate on this occasion”, where the court would take evidence on the importance of the matter of public concern, the publisher’s genuine track record of adherence to professional ethical standards, its resolve to remedy past breaches (if any), and its commitment to train their staff in legal and ethical issues. It should encourage other Australian jurisdictions to take a uniform approach.

Legal impediments to public interest journalism

Free expression and a free media should be foundational principles in any democratic society, and the principle of open justice should be equally foundational to any country with respect for the rule of law. Each is enshrined in its own way in international human rights instruments.[iii] Almost all democratic nations other than Australia include a right to free expression or a free media in their Constitutions or ancillary documents. However, the closest Australia has to any such constitutional recognition is the High Court’s so-called implied freedom to communicate on matters of politics and government, which has evolved in a qualified fashion through a series of cases since the 1990s.[iv] The proof of the inadequacy of the principles of media freedom and open justice in Australia can be found in the exceptions to those liberties in a litany of laws across Australia’s nine jurisdictions which serve to impede attempts at public interest journalism. They are evident in both the common law and in legislation in areas including (but not limited to) defamation (despite purported uniformity), contempt, trespass, surveillance, confidentiality, privacy, source protection, court and tribunal suppressions and identification restrictions, along with a host of national security and anti-terror laws.

Even measures designed to allow greater freedoms to those engaged in public interest journalism suffer from jurisdictional inconsistency, with significant differences apparent in whistleblower protections, journalists’ shield laws and the courts’ tolerance of journalists’ use of new communication technologies. Some, like freedom of information laws, have been abused and eroded by your colleagues across the political spectrum as they have exploited the numerous exemptions to their own protection and advantage, prompting cynics to call them ‘freedom from information’ laws. As former foreign minister Alexander Downer once told newspaper publishers: ‘Freedom of information always seems a great idea when you are in Opposition but less so when you are in Government’.[v]

This leaves public interest journalism battling this array of laws at State, Territory and Commonwealth levels limiting free expression and a free media because of competing rights and interests – often without free expression or a free media being acknowledged in the wording of certain statutes or in their interpretation in cases. The Senate must bear the responsibility for passing some of these laws and the various attorneys-general across jurisdictions and political affiliations must accept culpability for failing to work to ensure their uniformity.

Exceptions and journalist/news media privileges

There a few privileges, exemptions or defences available to journalists and news organisations, which vary markedly in their wording, including:

  1. The Privacy Act, which at s7B(4) which exempts ‘media organisations’ which are ‘publicly committed’ to privacy standards published by themselves or their representative organization;
  2. The Australian Consumer Law (detailed at Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010), which offers a broad ‘media safe harbour’ (Section 19) to ‘information providers’ under the ‘misleading and deceptive conduct’ provisions (Section 18).
  3. Shield laws, which at Commonwealth level offer a discretion to the courts to excuse a journalist from revealing a source, in consideration of “the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public by the news media”[vi];
  4. Metadata retention laws, which offer a limited and opaque protection to professional journalists under protocols detailed at Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 at Division 4C. The protocols were famously breached in 2017 when the AFP admitted a journalist’s call records had been accessed without following the procedures.[vii]
  5. A fair dealing defence for the purpose of news under the Copyright Act, itself subject to a judicially determined reasonableness test.[viii]
  6. Uniform state and territory defamation laws, which make available a qualified privilege ‘public interest’ defence;[ix]
  7. A common law ‘public interest’ defence to sub judice contempt (known as the ‘Bread Manufacturers’ defence);[x]
  8. A range of other limited exemptions available in journalistic or public interest grounds (sometimes at the discretion of the court) in various jurisdictions including the use of recording devices in court, contacting jurors, publishing secretly recorded conversations, reporting upon closed court cases, interviewing prisoners or parolees, identifying sexual assault victims with their permission, etc.[xi]

While such limited exemptions offer some acknowledgement of the importance of public interest journalism, free expression and open justice, their wording is ad hoc and their application across jurisdictions is unpredictable. This is farcical in an era of global publication to 24/7 deadlines by a large variety of organisations and individuals engaged in public interest journalism in its multiple forms – many of whom might not even call themselves ‘journalists’ in a traditional sense of the term, but who might nevertheless be engaging in the practice[xii].

Some statutes offer blanket exemptions which in some ways encourage the creation and republication of fake news, celebrity gossip and click bait misinformation. The Australian Consumer Law is a prime example, where the ‘media safe harbour’ (Section 19) offered to ‘information providers’ under the ‘misleading and deceptive conduct’ provisions (Section 18) allows news organisations have a blanket, almost unchallengeable protection for misleading and deceptive conduct. I proposed to the Independent Media Inquiry in 2011 that there should be a rebuttable presumption that corporations publish responsible news and current affairs material of legitimate public interest in accordance with a journalism code of practice to earn this exemption[xiii].

A ‘public interest journalism’ exemption or defence

A simple and effective measure to reduce this imposition on public interest journalism would be for the Senate to require all Commonwealth legislation imposing a demonstrable limitation upon the enterprise of public interest journalism to include a ‘public interest journalism’ exemption or defence. This would confer a discretion to a court to make an exception to the operation of the particular measure in instances where there may be a public interest in the communication of a matter of genuine public concern which at least balances, or perhaps outweighs, other rights and interests in the particular circumstances.

The current exemptions within the control of the Commonwealth (privacy law, consumer law, shield laws, etc) would be simplified where possible to meet such a test. In some cases this would require those exempted under current legislation to do more to demonstrate they are worthy of such an exemption (under the Privacy Act s7B(4), for example, ‘media organisations’ are automatically exempted if they are ‘publicly committed’ to privacy standards published by themselves or their representative organization.) In other cases the existing laws should be broadened to the advantage of others who demonstrably engage in public interest journalism. (For example, academics, non-government organisations, journalism students and serious bloggers might then qualify for shield laws which at Commonwealth level are currently restricted to “journalists” being people “engaged and active in the publication of news”.[xiv] This would attach the exemptions to those engaging in the enterprise of ‘public interest journalism’ instead of trying to define who might qualify as a ‘journalist’ in the modern era).

I have deliberately not ventured into the wording of any such defence or exemption because that is not my area of expertise and the particularities of the restrictions will inevitably require slightly different wording in each situation. While its definition of ‘journalist’ at s 126K should be broadened, the Evidence Act 1995 s. 126K (2) is a useful starting point where it states:

(2)  The court may, on the application of a party, order that subsection (1) is not to apply if it is satisfied that, having regard to the issues to be determined in that proceeding, the public interest in the disclosure of evidence of the identity of the informant outweighs:

(a)  any likely adverse effect of the disclosure on the informant or any other person; and

(b)  the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public by the news media and, accordingly also, in the ability of the news media to access sources of facts.

(3)  An order under subsection (2) may be made subject to such terms and conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit.

The uniform Defamation Act[xv] offers guidance within its qualified privilege defence to the kinds of factors a judicial decision maker might take into account when deciding whether or not to allow such a public journalism exemption:

(3) In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the conduct of the defendant in publishing matter about a person is reasonable in the circumstances, a court may take into account:

(a) the extent to which the matter published is of public interest, and

(b) the extent to which the matter published relates to the performance of the public functions or activities of the person, and

(c) the seriousness of any defamatory imputation carried by the matter published, and

(d) the extent to which the matter published distinguishes between suspicions, allegations and proven facts, and

(e) whether it was in the public interest in the circumstances for the matter published to be published expeditiously, and

(f) the nature of the business environment in which the defendant operates, and

(g) the sources of the information in the matter published and the integrity of those sources, and

(h) whether the matter published contained the substance of the person’s side of the story and, if not, whether a reasonable attempt was made by the defendant to obtain and publish a response from the person, and

(i) any other steps taken to verify the information in the matter published, and

(j) any other circumstances that the court considers relevant.

Such other circumstances could include the legal and ethical track records of the individuals and organizations seeking the exemption and their demonstrable commitment to legal and ethical standards and training.

If the Commonwealth takes the leadership in such a simplification of the approach to a ‘public interest journalism’ exemption, then I am confident it can impose its considerable weight upon the states and territories via the Law, Crime and Community Safety Council and the Council of Australian Governments to mirror this approach in their myriad of publishing restrictions. Such a measure would help foster a real backbone of encouragement of genuine public interest journalism – whether created by large traditional media, freelancers, activists or new media entrepreneurs – in the absence of a constitutional right to free expression and a free media enshrined in a Bill of Rights, which appears to be an unrealistic aspiration at this stage. It would also offer genuine public interest journalism a market advantage over fake news, celebrity gossip and other unethical infotainment products.

I sincerely hope your committee is able to improve the standing of public interest journalism and wish you well in your deliberations.

Notes:

[i] Pearson, Mark and Mark Polden (2015). The Journalist’s Guide to Media Law. Allen & Unwin, Sydney.

[ii] Please note that some parts of this submission are explained further in my recent article in the journal Asia Pacific Media Educator’. Pearson, Mark (2017) ‘Teaching media law in a post-truth context – strategies for enhancing learning about the legal risks of fake news and alternative facts’ Asia Pacific Media Educator, 27(1) 1–10.

[iii] See, for example, Articles 11 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

[iv] See: Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211, Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520; Wotton v Qld [2012] HCA 2.

 

[v] McNicoll, D. D. (2006, 31 August). The diary. The Australian [Media section]. p. 18.

[vi] Evidence Act 1995, s. 126K.

[vii] Royes, Luke (2017) AFP officer accessed journalist’s call records in metadata breach. ABC News online. Available: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-28/afp-officer-accessed-journalists-call-records-in-metadata-breach/8480804

[viii] Copyright Act 1968 ss40 and 103B.

[ix] See Defamation Act NSW 2005 s. 30.

[x] Pearson & Polden, op. cit., p. 147.

[xi] See Pearson & Polden, op. cit., Chapter 6, ‘Covering Court’

[xii] See Slater v Blomfield [2014] NZHC 2221, at paras 47-55.

[xiii] Pearson, Mark. (2011). ‘Consumer law holds solution to grossly irresponsible journalism’. Journlaw blog. Available: https://journlaw.com/2011/11/07/consumer-law-holds-solution-to-grossly-irresponsible-journalism/

 

[xiv] Evidence Act 1995 ss. 126J and 126K

[xv] See Defamation Act NSW 2005 s. 30.

 

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Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

© Mark Pearson 2017

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Alternative media values offer hope in a ‘post-truth’ media world, says journalism academic

By MARK PEARSON

Alternative and community media offer a vehicle to combat the forces of ‘fake news’ in the so-called ‘post-truth’ era, Griffith University’s Associate Professor Susan Forde suggested in the 2017 Arts Education Law Professorial Lecture in Brisbane tonight (May 16).

Associate Professor Susan Forde delivers the 2017 AEL Professorial Lecture

The director of the Griffith Centre for Social and Cultural Research told her South Bank audience it was a tall order to expect the “somewhat diminished media sector” to shoulder the burden in a “neo-liberal era that has fairly successfully marginalized social democratic views of the world”.

She pointed to independent media operating on alternative funding models such as the Guardian, the New Daily, Crikey, the Monthly and New Matilda as a foundation for a “healthy and diverse media landscape”.

“In an advanced democracy, we do have structures which can support financial contributions to media organisations without threatening their independence and autonomy,” Dr Forde said.

“When we can deliver this – a much larger public and community-based media sector that is well supported – we will find it much easier to marginalise lound and deceitful voices.”

She was addressing the topic “The Media in Dangerous Times”, suggesting the traditional role of the Fourth Estate as an effective watchdog on power had been significantly challenged by a range of forces over the past decade.

“We’ve witnessed the rise of far-right political movements based on racism and identity politics and not much else,” she said.

“The media has been complicit in their rise. These two issues are tied together by a third factor and that is the successful marginalizing of thoughtful, informed and progressive views as political correctness and propaganda from a media elite.”

The decline in traditional media revenue streams at the expense of international new media platforms like Google and Facebook had prompted the removal of more than a quarter of Australia’s journalism workforce over the past six years – and the price that has been paid has been quality journalism.

But the answer for journalism was not to place faith in cost cutting and new technologies, but rather in content reflecting “a particular set of professional commitments and traits”.

Alternative media journalists were driven by such values, Dr Forde contended.

“They are driven to provide information to their audiences which will overtly encourage them to take part in democracy – to participate, to do something,”she said.

“They provide what we call mobilizing information.”

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Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

© Mark Pearson 2017

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