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Privacy then and now – a French connection to supplement #Leveson’s history lesson

By MARK PEARSON

Lord Justice Brian Leveson – who delivered his 2,000 page report on the British press on November 29 – addressed us in Sydney yesterday on ‘Privacy and the Internet’.

He steered well clear of commentary about his landmark report and its recommendations.

Instead, he drew upon some of the historical foundations of privacy law as a platform for an exploration of the issues surrounding privacy regulation in the Internet era.

His concluding comments demonstrated that link:

“(W)hile established legal norms are in many respects capable of application to the internet, it is likely that new ones and new laws will need to be developed.

“The rise of the media produced Warren and Brandeis’s famous dissertation on privacy law.

“The internet may well – and no doubt will – require us to think as creatively as they did.

“Only if we do so will we properly understand the role and values which underpin privacy and freedom of expression, the balance to be struck between them and the means to ensure that they are both safeguarded in an internet age.

“The answers we reach might differ from those we have reached in the past.”

Lord Justice Leveson devoted the first several minutes of his speech backgrounding the interface between nineteenth century technological innovations contributing to the famous Harvard Law Review article – ‘The Right to Privacy’ – by lawyers Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.

I also recently explored some of the historical background to privacy in my book Blogging and Tweeting Without Getting Sued: A global guide to the law for anyone writing online (Allen & Unwin, 2012) – and discovered a French connection in the process.

Here is an edited excerpt for those who may be interested.

Privacy rights and protections are a fairly recent legal development. For centuries gentlemen in Europe (and later North America) settled personal embarrassments and insults using the strictly codified practice of the duel – well documented in Best Served Cold – Studies in Revenge. Even today the tribal laws of many indigenous peoples invoke a physical punishment such as a beating or stoning for causing another to ‘lose face’ in a community – actions covered by both privacy and defamation laws in the developed world. While French courts were developing privacy law in the 1860s there was no notion of a formal ‘right to privacy’ in the English speaking world. Laws in the US, Britain and its former colonies had evolved over centuries to protect the individual’s space and reputation in several ways, including defamation, copyright, trespass, nuisance and confidentiality.

Let’s journey back to Paris in 1867, when gentlemen still duelled to the death over matters of pride. The practice was masterfully recorded by the writer Alexandre Dumas père in his novel The Three Musketeers. In real life, Dumas lived the extravagant lifestyle of the famous author in an era when the stars of print were the equivalent of screen idols today. He was besotted with 32-year-old actress Adah Isaacs Menken – the Paris Hilton of her time – regarded by some as the first female cult celebrity. The lovebirds posed for some saucy photographs (she in her underwear and he without the compulsory gentleman’s jacket) but the photographer then tried to trade on their celebrity by registering copyright in the images. Dumas felt aggrieved but, as James Q. Whitman explained in the Yale Law Journal, the court held his property rights had not been infringed. However, the judge decided Dumas did have a right in privacy that trumped any property right the photographer might have held. With that decision, privacy was born as a right in the legal world.

Across the Atlantic two decades later, in 1888, Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas Cooley wrote of a ‘right to be let alone’. Then, in a landmark Harvard Law Review article in December 1890, the great US jurist Samuel D. Warren and future Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis announced a new ‘right to privacy’ in an article by that very name. Warren had been angered when a daily newspaper had published the guest list of a high society dinner party his family had hosted at his Boston mansion, which he saw as a gross invasion of his privacy. The right to privacy owes its existence to a wealthy lawyer who resented the media prying into his personal life.

Warren and Brandeis wrote: ‘The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery’. Their words were chillingly similar to those used by the critics of celebrity gossip mags and websites today, particularly in the wake of London’s News of the World scandal which triggered the Leveson Inquiry.

Blogging and Tweeting Without Getting Sued: A global guide to the law for anyone writing online is now available in print and ebook formats worldwide.

[Media: For review copies please contact publicity@allenandunwin.com or call +61 2 8425 0146]

© Mark Pearson 2012

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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Terror is no laughing matter – lessons from the #twitterjoketrial

By MARK PEARSON

Twitter and Facebook are great outlets for one-liners and satire, but police and security agencies are not known for their sense of humour. Trainee accountant Paul Chambers, 27, learned that the hard way when he was arrested on UK terrorism charges for jokingly tweeting a threat to blow up a British airport. Air traffic was delayed by a heavy snowfall and Chambers was desperate to visit a female friend in Northern Ireland, so he light-heartedly tweeted to her and his 650 followers: ‘C***! Robin Hood Airport closed. You have got a week to get your s*** together, otherwise I’m blowing the airport sky high!’ Police swooped a week later and he was questioned on the terrorism charges before being convicted and fined £1,000 on a lesser charge of causing nuisance. He later won an appeal in the High Court when the Lord Chief Justice agreed it had been a humorous remark rather than a threat. The case became known as the ‘Twitter joke trial’. I’m fairly confident Chambers would not go through all that angst again over a not so witty one-liner.

Journalist, blogger, tweeter and lawyer David Allen Green ( @DavidAllenGreen ‘Jack of Kent’ ) spoke recently on the issue to the Open Rights Group.

Across the English Channel, 23-year-old unemployed Frenchman François Cousteix was surprised one evening to find French police and US FBI agents arrive at his front door. Operating under the name ‘Hacker Croll’, he had made it his hobby to access celebrities’ social media accounts just for fun. He had accessed the social media account of celebrity Britney Spears but came to international security agencies’ attention when he hacked into the Twitter account of US President Barack Obama. He escaped with a five month parole sentence.

There is a simple lesson from these cases: do not joke about national security matters.

Governments throughout the world ramped up their national security laws in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001. Even in countries with a high regard for civil liberties and free expression, new powers were handed to security agencies and police to aid in the detection and arrest of suspected terrorists. Pressure mounted in western democracies for even tougher laws after the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005 and the 7/7 London attacks in 2005.

Publishing restrictions in the name of national security existed long before 9/11. Sedition and treason laws encouraging public unrest, violence and the overthrow of rulers date back to feudal times when governments tried to enforce loyalty upon ordinary citizens. While many countries have phased out these ancient crimes, such laws are still used in some places as mechanisms for intimidation and repression. Anti-terrorism laws were also used in western democracies well prior to 2001. The UK passed special laws to respond to Irish Republican Army terrorism throughout the 20th century, while New Zealand introduced new restrictions after the French bombing of the Greenpeace boat the Rainbow Warrior in 1985.

But the early 21st century attacks on the West triggered a wave of new anti-terror laws impacting on the free expression of journalists and Internet users. Hundreds of anti-terror laws were introduced in the first decade of the 21st century under the banner of the so-called ‘War on Terror’.

America led the way with its USA ‘Patriot’ Act of 2001, in which the letters stand for: ‘Uniting (and) Strengthening America (by) Providing Appropriate Tools Required (to) Intercept (and) Obstruct Terrorism’. President Barack Obama’s administration extended the legislation for a further four years from 2011.

Others followed suit, including the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Ottawa software developer Momin Khawaja became the first person charged under Canada’s anti-terror laws but in 2011 challenged his conviction on constitutional grounds. In Australia, Belal Saadalah Khazaal was sentenced to 12 years in jail in 2009 for ‘making a document connected with assistance in a terrorist act’ after he created an e-book titled “Provisions on the Rules of Jihad” which allegedly targeted foreign governments and leaders. The High Court upheld his conviction in 2012.

There were too many anti-terror laws introduced internationally to detail here, but some can impact upon you if you are a cyber-journalist or blogger. They include:

  • Increased surveillance powers for spy agencies and police;
  • New detention and questioning regimes;
  • Seizure of notes and computer archives;
  • Exposing confidential sources to identification;
  • Closing certain court proceedings so they are unreportable;
  • Exposing bloggers to fines and jail if they report on some anti-terror operations;
  • Making it an offence to merely ‘associate’ or ‘communicate’ with those suspected of security crimes; and
  • Exposing bloggers and social media users to criminal charges if you publish anything seen as inciting terrorism.

Governments also go straight to search engines and ISPs and demand they remove material and, as Google’s Transparency Report documents, they often comply. But some have complained Google and Youtube have not responded quickly enough when asked to take down terrorism material. Burst.net certainly acted fast when the FBI advised it that some blogs it hosted under the free WordPress blogetery.com site contained terrorist material suspected of being used by the group al-Qaeda. It shut the site down, along with the 70,000 blogs it hosted. Blogetery resurfaced a month later under a different host.

The United Nations introduced a range of protocols that countries adopt minimum standards for combating terrorism. At the same time, the OECD acted to encourage Internet freedom by asking nations to open up cyberspace to freer and speedier communication. To the average blogger, the two positions might seem at odds.

A Mexican radio commentator and a maths tutor were jailed and faced a maximum 30 year prison sentence in 2011 on terrorism and sabotage charges after they tweeted false reports that gunmen were attacking schools in the city of Veracruz. The misinformation prompted parents to panic and some were involved motor accidents as they rushed to fetch their children.

“Here, there were 26 car accidents, or people left their cars in the middle of the streets to run and pick up their children, because they thought these things were occurring at their kids’ schools,” an official told Associated Press. The false reports followed weeks of gangland violence in the city.

“My sister-in-law just called me all upset, they just kidnapped five children from the school,” tutor Gilberto Martinez Vera allegedly tweeted. He followed that message with: “I don’t know what time it happened, but it’s true.” The other accused had retweeted the false reports to her followers. Experts described the tweeting as poor use of the medium, but not deserving of terrorism charges.

[Adapted from my book, Blogging and Tweeting Without Getting Sued. A Global Guide to the Law for Anyone Writing Online. (Allen & Unwin, 2012).

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

© Mark Pearson 2012

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The @journlaw slide presentation to the World Public Relations Forum #wprf

By MARK PEARSON

The World Public Relations Forum was held in Melbourne this week and I participated (with Claire O’Rourke from Essential Media) in a feature presentation on social media law and ethics for public relations practitioners. Here are my slides from my presentation on ‘Blogging and Tweeting Without Getting Sued’ for your use (with full attribution, of course). I hope you find them helpful.

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WorldPRForumMarkPearson(@journlaw)presentation19-11-12

© Mark Pearson 2012

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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A question and tweet-driven approach to deeper media law learning

By MARK PEARSON

What’s in a question? A whole lot of learning, if you ask students in my Ethical and Legal Strategies for the Media class this semester.

It has always been a challenge to get students to digest and understand the relevant chapter readings for the week’s lecture topic. Over the years I have experimented with a range of assessment tools to do so, including the traditional law school ‘fictitious fact scenario’ problem-based approach, end of chapter exercises and responses, and mini-quizzes on the chapter contents.

This semester I have developed a two-step weekly assignment which has generated some lively in-class discussions based upon a genuine depth of understanding of the material among most students.

Students are required to read the week’s chapter of the text and a. Compose a tweet including the subject code #hashtag referring their peers to a recent case, news report or commentary on the topic; and b. Compose an analytical extension question, demonstrating they have understood the chapter readings and have posed a question worthy of class discussion during the lecture session. They are graded on the quality of the question, as outlined in the rubric below.

I spend a few moments arranging the students’ questions into themes and then pose them, leading class discussion in place of the traditional Powerpoint-driven slideshow lecture. The slides are there as a backup, of course, to return to key foundational learning points, but most time is spent debating the potential answers to the questions students have raised. Here are some examples from the semester’s crop thus far:

  • As social media continues to satisfy society’s appetite for news and court reporting, will judge-only trials become more commonplace to ensure justice is done?
  • Can technology ever replace the role of court reporters?
  • Why would anyone decide not to sue for defamation after they have been defamed?
  • Are there any changes proposed for defamation laws to focus more closely on social media, particularly trolls?
  • What matters most – closed courts in sex cases to fully protect the ID of the victim or open courts to protect open justice?

Every one of these questions shows the student has understood the topic and grappled with a dilemma arising from it. Each could be the subject of a research project in its own right.

Universities are meant to be about constructing, researching and attempting to resolve such deeper questions. This exercise rewards students who apply analytical skills to journalism and social media law topics, and elevates the subject above the ‘black letter law’ approach that was the hallmark of media law courses in the 20th century.

I offer you the rubric for the assignment below. Feel free to use it, critique it and adapt it. File any feedback below. Cheers.

JOUR12-230 Ethical and Legal Strategies for the Media  (2 copies needed at start of lecture – one for your reference and one to submit. Not accepted by email, sorry.)

Date and topic this week:

Name:  

Your tweet on this week’s topic. (Compulsory). Must include insightful comment and/or link to recent case or article on topic TWEET:

 

 

…#JOUR12-230 @journlaw

ANALYTICAL EXTENSION QUESTION criteria.

 

ANALYTICAL EXTENSION QUESTION:
Criterion Poor Fair Good Excellent
Understanding of chapter readings        
Important extension of inquiry BEYOND those readings        
Clear and simple question structure        
Other comments:

 

 

 

 

 

%

Example of EXCELLENT question on Defamation: “How has the High Court dealt with the political qualified privilege defence since the textbook was published in 2011?”

Example of POOR question on Defamation: “What is defamation and give an example?”

Example of defamation tweet:

#Defamation suit pits casino owner against creator of ‘Girls Gone Wild’ – bit.ly/OXX3bq #freespeech #JOUR12-230 @journlaw

© Mark Pearson 2012

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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Courting trouble naming sex crime victims on social media: ignorance no excuse

By MARK PEARSON

News that nine Facebook and Twitter users in the UK have been ordered to pay compensation to a rape victim after identifying her on social media sounds a warning that we are all now publishers and subject to the same laws as mainstream media. Here is an edited excerpt from my new book  – Blogging and Tweeting Without Getting Sued: A global guide to the law for anyone writing online (Allen & Unwin, 2012) – explaining the basic principles of court reporting restrictions for lay users of social media.

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Courting secrecy

Despite the existence of the ‘open justice’ principle, online writers face restrictions on their reporting of crimes and other matters before the court. Your behaviour, postings and comments can lead to substantial fines or even jail terms if you breach the laws of contempt of court and the many and varied bans on reporting certain court matters and identifying certain people in the courtroom. Reporters who cover court every day know these restrictions well and are trained to deal with them – although sometimes they slip up as happened recently in a Tasmanian case prompting a push for law reform. The challenge for bloggers and social media writers is that you might be unaware of the fact that certain names and other identifying matters cannot be published in particular kinds of cases. In fact, some cases are closed to the public and cannot be reported at all.

The rules vary markedly between countries, but the most common restrictions are on identifying victims of sex crimes (and sometimes the sex accused), juvenile offenders and witnesses, jurors, and parties to family law disputes. Sometimes the whole court is closed for these and other proceedings such as preliminary hearings, military and national security trials and mental illness hearings.

The temptation for the gossip or sports blogger might be to mention some of these matters in postings about celebrities, perhaps via family or friends, without being aware of the court restrictions on identification. Heavy fines and even jail terms apply in some places if you break these prohibitions. At the very least you need to check what bans apply in both your own jurisdiction and the place of the court proceedings before firing off those words or images.

Gags, but not the funny kind

Sometimes a judge will use their power to issue orders prohibiting publication of some aspect of a court case and occasionally even the whole case. These are known as injunctions, suppression orders, gag orders and stop writs. Last month a Victorian magistrate issued such an order against publication of information about the man accused of murdering Melbourne ABC worker Jill Meagher – although Michael Bradley from Marque Lawyers highlighted some problems with that one.

When the orders ban you from revealing even the fact that the order has been issued, they are known as ‘super injunctions’. These prompted a social media nightmare for the English courts when they were issued in relation to privacy matters in 2010 and 2011. It came to a head in May, 2011, when footballer Ryan Giggs was named in the House of Commons as the person at the centre of an anonymity injunction after 75,000 Twitter users had already tweeted his name. A Times journalist was threatened with a contempt of court charge for tweeting the footballer’s name to his followers in breach of the order. It was believed to be the first time the Attorney-General had been formally asked to consider contempt charges against a social media user.

Gags like super injunctions have also been used in the US. The New York Times reported in 2008 that the owners of political website Room 8 received a grand jury subpoena to disclose the authors of some of their anonymous bloggers. They were threatened with prosecution if they revealed they had even received the subpoena. In another example, Florida-based legal blogger David O. Markus explained the frustrations of dealing with a gag order on his Southern District of Florida Blog after a judge in a terrorism trial issued one and then partially lifted it in 2008. Markus was then allowed to blog about some aspects of an ongoing immigration case without going into the details of the alleged bombing plot which shared many of the same facts.

Blogs covering sensitive national security information or sexual taboos are much more likely to be gagged, sometimes permanently. In 2009 Seattle University postgraduate law student Danielle M. Cross explained how Californian courts were able to uphold permanent injunctions against websites set up by a paedophile to track the movements of young girls at public events.

Take down notices

Sometimes the injunction is in the form of a notice to ‘take down’ certain material from a site or to shut down the whole site. This is sometimes issued to the ISP or search engine host. In 2011 Google complied with a ‘preventative closure’ order from an Italian court to remove an English language blog titled ‘Perugia Shock’ criticising aspects of the prosecution of an alleged murder of a British exchange student by her US roommate. (The accused, Amanda Knox, was later acquitted.)  The blog reappeared elsewhere, the Washington Post reported. In Australia, media organisations were ordered to remove from their searchable archives material related to the upcoming trial of a prominent criminal figure. Former News Limited chief executive John Hartigan criticised such take down notices for their expense and unrealistic application in an address to our Courts and the Media in the Digital Era symposium at Bond University last year.

Blogging and Tweeting Without Getting Sued: A global guide to the law for anyone writing online is now available in print and ebook formats worldwide.

[Media: For review copies please contact publicity@allenandunwin.com or call +61 2 8425 0146]

© Mark Pearson 2012

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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Counter-terror laws under review – our appearance at COAG

By MARK PEARSON

Griffith University colleague Associate Professor Jacqui Ewart (@jacquiewart) and I appeared before the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) hearing into the review of counter-terrorism laws conducted in Brisbane yesterday.

We explained our collaborative research on the subject, and called upon the committee to take account of the importance of free expression, open justice and transparency of process to a democracy like Australia.

The laws under review are listed here.

I began by explaining that national security laws introduced since September 2001 affected the ability of journalists to investigate into and report upon particular incidents, identify and communicate with sources of information for such reportage, preserve the confidentiality of such sources, report fairly and accurately court proceedings related to counter-terrorism, expose miscarriages of justice, and  to draw upon actual examples when covering the broader issues of national security and counter-terrorism.

Australia differed from other democratic nations in that it lacks written constitutional protection of free expression.

I suggested that given the absence of any such free expression protection here, there was a crucial need for public interest or media exemptions to provisions threatening free expression.

Perhaps the committee could appoint an independent adviser or a representative from a body such as the Australian Press Council to review any proposed legislation with an eye to its implications for free expression.

Dr Ewart made the following points in our submission:

When the anti-terrorism legislation was introduced in 2004 and 2005 there was much discussion about the potential impacts these laws would have on journalists and the public right to know about terrorism cases, but much of that discussion was at the time speculation. Since then we have seen demonstrable evidence of the impacts of those laws on the ability of journalists to report on national security matters and to inform the public. These impacts include but are not limited to:

  • Suppression orders are now routinely invoked in terrorism-related court cases to prevent journalists’ from reporting details of cases that may be in the public interest and may not be against national security interests. While there was recently a move towards cooperation between the media and the judiciary in relation to suppression orders (Operation Pendennis court trials under J Bongiorno), this is not standard practice.
  • Sedition laws have restricted freedom of expression in the media. The legal provisions regarding journalists reporting the detention of suspects under the ASIO Act have implications for journalists, and much broader consequences for individuals’ freedom of speech.
  • Media reliance on official spokespeople has increased because of arrest, questioning and detention restrictions once a suspect has been arrested, as evidenced by the controls of information flows by the Australian Federal Police in the arrest and charging of Dr Mohamed Haneef.
  • Recent demands by judges for journalists to reveal their sources of counter-terror stories, evidenced by the making of such demands upon The Australian’s Cameron Stewart regarding leaks from the Federal Police over the Holsworthy Barracks raids.
  • Further to the preceding point, the freezing of information about counter-terror operations by government agencies after the above incident where The Australian published an account of one operation before it started. This led to police/media protocols for future counter-terrorism stories.
  • The potential for the confidentiality of a journalist’s source being compromised through the investigative powers of anti-terror agencies. This may erode the public’s confidence in the media, preventing members of the public from approaching journalists with stories or information.
  • The readiness of counter-terror agencies and prosecutors to make use of raw footage and interview material captured by journalists as prosecution evidence in their cases against terror suspects, as per the Jack Thomas trial.
  •  A warning from an Attorney-General to an academic about his research involving the interviews with suspected terrorists overseas renders journalists’ interviews with terrorists on foreign territory problematic.

We are also unaware of potential problems for those arrested or questioned under the ASIO Act because of the restrictions placed on individuals in relation to telling others including the media they have been arrested or questioned and those restrictions extend to journalists.

This means that the ability of the media to freely – real national security implications notwithstanding – fairly and accurately report terrorism cases has been at times severely hindered by the legislation.

We concluded by recommending the review of the legislation specifically examines the question of the impacts of the legislation on journalists’ ability to cover terrorism cases and terrorism-related court cases, in order to ensure the protection of the public interest in such cases. We provided the committee with an extended explanation in the form of an article on the topic we recently submitted to an international refereed journal.

© Mark Pearson and Jacqueline Ewart 2012

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Social media legal risks for journalists – the journlaw.com guide to staying safe in the Web 2.0 era

By MARK PEARSON

The latest edition of the Walkley Magazine is out – with the issue in the mail to subscribers and articles gradually being posted to its website. As a teaser, here’s my contribution on the legal risks of social media for journalists:

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Journalists and bloggers face new legal pitfalls in the Web 2.0 publishing environment, writes MARK PEARSON

Industry upheaval has prompted many journalists to retool as bloggers, multimedia producers and social media editors – each with its own set of legal risks.

These roles present exciting new dimensions to journalism – conversations and engagement with audiences, instant global publishing at the press of a button, and new opportunities to share content. But they also present levels of legal exposure most twentieth century journalists did not envisage.

Most of the principles covered in the dusty old media law tomes on a journalist’s bookshelf still hold true for defamation, contempt and confidentiality, but their Web 2.0 application is still being clarified by the courts and reporters and editors need to be aware of their personal legal liability across a range of risk categories.

Old laws, new contexts

Defamation and contempt are still high risk areas for all publishers and numerous judgments in Australia and abroad have established the rules apply just as readily to web and social media postings. Of course, damages awards might be limited if you tarnish someone’s reputation on your Facebook page to your small group of friends. But if your post prompts just one of them to cancel a lucrative contract with the victim, those damages might escalate quickly.

Twitter is still relatively new and the courts are grappling with its implications. For example, judges are yet to decide whether you face any special liability when others retweet your message.  A conservative view would be that a retweeter takes over your liability by republishing – just as anyone forwarding an email did previously. But if your nasty remark goes viral on Twitter the courts might well decide that you should have anticipated republication when you tweeted the original message – because the retweet is so central to the medium. This is virgin territory.

There is still no actionable right to privacy in Australia, although several court decisions and law reform recommendations are moving towards a new statutory tort of privacy invasion. Breach of confidence certainly exists as a legal action and this has been extended in the UK to private information and circumstances.

Facebook comes into play here as journalists download and republish private data and photographs of individuals in the wake of a tragedy or in the midst of a controversy.

That practice also brings us to the murky world of intellectual property and copyright in social media where the media and bloggers have adopted a cut and paste approach to the words and images of others online. This defies the clear international legal position which is that ‘freely viewed does not equal freely used’.

Intellectual property is a double-edged sword. It’s amazing how some publishers will complain about the theft of their own words or images while their staff are madly appropriating the words and images of others online.

New risks in old newsrooms

The new roles journalists have embraced in their existing newsrooms and the changing ways their organisations work with user-generated content across platforms present other hazards.

Moderation of website and social media comment threads has become a new position description – with inherent legal responsibilities.

A recent West Australian case centred upon racist comments on News Limited’s Perth Now website about indigenous youths who had died in a car accident. The fact that the comments were seen and approved by a moderator influenced the Federal Court’s decision to order the publisher to pay the boys’ mother $12,000 compensation for her humiliation under the Racial Discrimination Act.

The landmark case in the field was ACCC v Allergy Pathways in 2011 where then Federal Court Justice Ray Finkelstein (yes, that Ray Finkelstein of media inquiry fame) held that a company was responsible for comments made by others on its corporate Facebook page.

He suggested the comments – in breach of consumer law – should have been removed within a reasonable time during a routine review process.

But what is a ‘reasonable time’ – and does that period differ in serious defamation, contempt or race hate examples? This raises the legal and industrial issue of whether social media editors should be expected to conduct 24/7 monitoring of comments by other citizens (perhaps nasty trolls) on their social media sites.

Journalists would be well advised to clarify this and other aspects of their social media use in the terms of their contracts and to seek input into the social media policies of their employers.

Some columnists have had their services terminated over their inappropriate social media use, but journalists struggle with the confusion over their workplace and private social media persona, given the fact they publish, blog and tweet under their real names.

Special exposure in new contexts

While some are taking on new digital roles in mainstream media outfits, many are offering their services on freelance or contract terms and others are taking up newly created positions in private enterprise or government.

These work environments typically lack the traditional media’s history of daily engagement with media law, including on-call advice from in-house legal counsel and a generous budget line for courtroom stoushes.

If you are a freelancer or contractor you would be wise to take advice on your own exposure and professional indemnity insurance options – something you didn’t need when you were on the payroll of a large media enterprise.

If you are taking up a new media position in a corporation or government department you should review your work contract carefully for evidence of the industrial consequences you might face if your writing, editing or production triggers legal action.

A defamation threat that might have appeared routine to your managing editor at a newspaper or television network might well be viewed as a crisis by your new corporate boss or public service chief and it might even place your job on the line.

As we wave goodbye to journalism as we knew it, opportunities are arising in the mainstream media and beyond.

Media law was always a core training requirement for cadets and journalism students. Now all journalists need to update and extend that knowledge so they can assess their legal exposure across a broader range of work environments and functions.

© Mark Pearson 2012

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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Why #Assange and journalists should not sue for #defamation

By MARK PEARSON

 

It is always sad to see journalists and free expression advocates threatening to sue over the reportage and commentary of others.

 

Of course, journalists and freedom fighters are citizens too – so they certainly have the right to resort to defamation action to achieve their ends and to help restore reputational damage they may have suffered.

 

But we have heard today that two Australians – Wikileaks’ Julian Assange and Sunday Telegraph reporter Jonathan Marshall – are threatening defamation action over commentary about their respective roles as public figures. That is a great shame.

 

Two years ago – soon after the editor of a national daily newspaper threatened to sue a journalism academic – I penned a piece for Crikey! outlining my reasons editors should refrain from resorting to litigation when they take umbrage at comments made in the cut and thrust of public debate. I’ve those comments here to adapt them to the circumstances of these latest threats.

 

The reality is that any media outlet worth its salt – and Wikileaks more than most! – is in the defamation business. The columns of newspapers, news websites and the broadcast news outlets should be laden thick with defamation every day if their journalists are doing their jobs properly.

 

Lord Northcliffe is supposed to have said: “News is what somebody somewhere wants to suppress; all the rest is advertising.” But the bulk of that defamatory material is — or should be — defensible. The defences vary somewhat between countries, and between jurisdictions within countries, but most allow truthful defamation, defamation in the public interest published reasonably, defamatory opinions on public matters based on provable facts, and fair and accurate defamatory reportage of important public gatherings.

 

Law in the United States developed further under its constitutional First Amendment protection of a free press to allow even untruths about public figures to be published, so long as they were not published maliciously.

 

Journalists and free expression warriors like Julian Assange do not normally sue over public commentary — for a host of reasons.

 

  • Given they are in the defamation business themselves, most see it as part of the cut and thrust of public debate.
  • Many understand the defences and realise that the reputational slur will often be protected.
  • Journalists are used to telephoning people and having it out with them at an intellectual level. Many disputes are resolved that way, both for and against the media.
  • Most realise there are other avenues of recourse, perhaps through their own medium and perhaps via some mechanism for complaint.
  • Most are too poor, and defamation litigation can be unpredictable and costly, particularly if it reaches the appeal stage.

 

To balance this, of course, occasionally someone will make the most heinous false allegation about a journalist of a sexual nature, and everyone would understand them pursuing the matter through the courts, particularly if there were no other means of recourse.

 

But most have an editor or a news director who will counsel them against using libel laws to resolve a dispute, which brings us to the additional reasons editors rarely sue. (Remember, Assange has carried the title ‘editor-in-chief’ of Wikileaks).

 

  • Most have editorialised countless times about press freedom and it runs, like ink, through their veins. Most have quoted Voltaire, Milton, Mill, Jefferson and Burke in their editorials espousing how truth will win out and defending all citizens’ right to free expression. This extends to even allowing untruths to be aired and demolished in the marketplace of ideas. As Milton wrote: “Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter.’ Assange himself stands on a free expression platform, and recently drew upon that principle in his call for the US to cease its pursuit of him.
  • Editors fear their own example in suing for defamation will encourage more lawsuits against their own media outlet by others. It sends a message to the rich and powerful everywhere that even editors believe libel action is a superior method of dispute resolution to a Press Council, ACMA or journalists’ union complaint.
  • Most editors and news directors have been involved in litigation themselves or have witnessed how time-consuming and distracting it can be for their journalists. Four Corners investigative reporter Chris Masters laments the decade he spent in the courts justifying his Moonlight State expose of corruption in Queensland. Most see lawyers and litigation as enormous time wasters, distracting them from their greater purpose.
  • That said, some have been at the forefront of pursuing free expression through the courts. The Australian, through its parent company Nationwide News, was crucial in 1994 convincing the High Court to overturn a law that banned criticism of the Industrial Relations Commission or its members. This was one plank in the court’s development of an implied constitutional freedom to communicate on matters of politics and government and an historic victory for media freedom.
  • Most editors and news directors would be loath to expose their own behaviour and their companies’ past performance to the scrutiny that is inevitable in the discovery process and trial. They might be purer than the Pope or the Dalai Lama, but lawyers will inevitably find, or create, examples in their past that erode their case. Most have seen this happen in countless pyrrhic victories in the courts where the “winner” has had all sorts of character slurs made against them.
  • Related to this is the media coverage attached to the case itself, which normally increases a hundredfold the repetition of the original slur. Many a successful plaintiff has later said they regretted the whole process.
  • Most have belonged to industry groups fighting for free expression in society.
  • Most abhor the use of libel as a weapon in despotic regimes throughout the world and many are members of organisations fighting against this.
  • Most in Western democratic countries secretly covet the US First Amendment, which makes public figures fair game, particularly when the defamation — even falsities — relates to their performance.

 

Finally, and most importantly, unlike doctors, lawyers, sportspeople or politicians, the very act of suing for libel sends a reputational message about the journalist, editor or freedom fighter himself or herself: that they are the kind of person who would use a defamation action to pursue someone else who has exercised free expression.

 

Unlike any other, that very act puts their reputation as a journalist on the line among their peers and the broader thinking community. Most would prefer to be remembered for their accomplishments as a journalist or editor than to become a textbook case as one of the few who sued to shut someone else up.

 

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See journlaw.com’s DEFAMATION update page for a range of recent defamation cases, many of which have involved social media.

© Mark Pearson 2012

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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The media regulation debate in a democracy lacking a free expression guarantee

By MARK PEARSON

The latest edition of Pacific Journalism Review is out – a special issue edited by Chris Nash, David Robie and Johan Lidberg on ‘Rebuilding Public Trust’.

My contribution carries the same title as this blog. Here are the abstract and conclusion, but if you’re really interested you’ll need to get PJR for the body of the article and the references – and, of course, another 13 articles by some of the region’s top journalists and researchers.

Abstract

Two major inquiries into the Australian news media in 2011 and 2012 prompted a necessary debate over the extent to which rapidly converging and globalised news businesses and platforms require statutory regulation at a national level.  Three regulatory models emerged – a News Media Council backed by recourse to the contempt powers of courts; a super self-regulatory body with legislative incentives to join; and the status quo with a strengthened Australian Press Council policing both print and online media. This article reviews the proposals and explores further the suggestion that consumer laws could be better utilised in any reform. It concludes with an assessment of the impact of the inquiries and their recommendations upon free expression in a Western democracy lacking constitutional protection of the media.

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Conclusion

The Convergence Review report cleverly proposed the removal of some existing protections instead of the imposition of draconian new regulations, but then failed to flesh out their possibilities. It needed to position its mechanism of privacy and consumer law exemptions for signatories to its new pan-media self-regulatory body as much more than hypothetical and to detail its plans for the implementation of these proposals.

Australia already has one statutory regulator with powers to punish ethical transgressions – the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). In an era of increasingly commercialised and converged media, it seems reasonable that at least some forms of irresponsible journalism might be addressed via the legislative mechanism prohibiting misleading and deceptive conduct by any corporation against media consumers.

Such a legislative solution already exists, as identified by the Convergence Review – and it only requires an amendment to the existing news organisation immunity from prosecution under the ‘misleading and deceptive conduct’ provisions at Section 18 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. The proposal to take away media exemptions from prosecution under this section would leave them accountable for misleading and deceptive claims and behaviour in their editorial functions.

While misleading and deceptive conduct does not take in all unethical behaviour by news organisations or the journalists who act as their agents, it could well be read to cover such sins as lies, inaccuracy, subterfuge, and lack of verification of the false claims of others. The amendment would mean both the ACCC (and private citizens) could launch prosecutions over such behaviour, with the force of the regulatory powers it already holds. The key to this would be an amendment of the ‘prescribed information provider’ exception (Section 19) so that news organisations would no longer have the blanket, almost unchallengeable protection for misleading and deceptive conduct which was introduced after their lobbying in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They would only earn this exemption if they were signatories to the new self-regulatory body and abiding by its requirements.

I have previously backgrounded this news media exemption to consumer law provisions under the predecessor to the existing legislation, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Pearson, 2000). The media operated for more than a decade under that law without special exemptions from its misleading and deceptive conduct provisions. In 1984, Section 52 (the ‘misleading and deceptive conduct’ clause under the TPA) caused concern in the case of Global Sportsman v. Mirror Newspapers (1984) 2 FCR 82 when it was held that the publication of statements – including statements of opinion made in the ordinary course of news – could constitute conduct which was “misleading or deceptive”.

Successful lobbying by the media led to the government of the day introducing the exemption from the provision for “prescribed information providers” unless the deception occurred in relation to the publication of advertisements or in articles promoting the information providers’ own commercial interests. “Prescribed information providers” included “…a person who carries on a business of providing information” and included obviously newspapers, holders of broadcasting licenses, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and the Special Broadcasting Service Corporation (SBS).

The exemption – known as the ‘media safe harbour’ – acknowledged the fact that news organisations could not vouch for every claim made by those quoted in their news columns or stories (Applegarth, 2008). However, the instant news material was sponsored, or run in return for some compensation in cash or kind, or was used to promote the news organisation’s own operations (such as in a promo), it fell within the Act and left any misleading content open to prosecution of the media proprietor.

This rendered journalists and their organisations particularly vulnerable in the realm of advertorials, if it could be shown that space had been devoted to the promotion of a company’s products or services just because they happened to be advertising or they had reached some arrangement or understanding with some corporation to that effect.

If such claims were proven to be misleading or deceptive the media outlet was held responsible and could face an injunction preventing publication or a damages claim from those adversely affected.

The provision raised serious questions about media companies’ cross-promotion of their related corporate interests, particularly in an age where concentrated conglomerates had substantial shareholdings and sponsorships across industries. The exemption has been struck down by superior courts in two recent cases. The High Court found against a media organisation under the former Trade Practices Act in ACCC v. Channel Seven Brisbane Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 19.  That decision related to false claims on the tabloid television current affairs program ‘Today Tonight’ about goods and services. The reform would extend this to other ethical breaches. The NSW Court of Appeal had earlier ruled that Nine’s ‘A Current Affair’ did not qualify for the exemption over misleading claims made by their staff who posed as prospective customers in an expose of a home construction company. Their false claims were made in the course of their investigation – not while carrying on the business of providing information – and they had failed to reveal that they were in the information provision business during their inquiry. As Justice Applegarth has noted: “Statements made in the course of an investigation are said to lack such correspondence because they do not occur ‘in the course of carrying on’ a business of providing information.” (2008, p. 3).

Of course, the consumer laws apply to corporations rather than individuals, so journalists themselves would not be liable personally, well exemplified in the Current Affair case cited above. However, it is likely their employer organisations would pressure them to comply when faced with the prospect of ACCC prosecutions and contempt charges for disobeying any resulting orders.

The Convergence Review’s suggestion that a similar ‘carrot’ be applied to the exemptions to privacy law is more problematic. The ‘Journalism’ exemption to the Privacy Act 1988 at s. 7B(4) references privacy standards issued by the Australian Press Council as newspaper organisations’ ticket to a waiver (APC, 2011). Media organisations simply have to avow they are ‘publicly committed to observe standards’ on privacy as documented by their representative organisation. However, the proposed reform would require more of them than simply being ‘publicly committed to observe standards’ and to have published them.

If they refused to sign up for the Convergence Review’s ‘self-regulator’ they would have to follow in their journalism all of the privacy protocols applying to other corporations and marketers. Permissions would need to be sought and documented every time a citizen was named or identified visually in a news story or column and every time ‘private’ details about them and their lives were being published. It would be a logistical nightmare for a news organization. There are already a myriad of laws of defamation, trespass, data protection, surveillance, confidentiality, discrimination, consumer law, stalking, court publishing restrictions, suppression orders and copyright controlling the news media’s handling of private information. The recommendation comes at a time the government is also considering a proposal for a ‘statutory cause of action for a serious invasion of privacy’ – giving citizens the right to sue over a privacy breach and receive either an award of damages or an injunction to stop publication. If the statutory tort were introduced, then the removal of the Privacy Act exemption for media companies would appear to be overkill given the array of other laws in the field.

Reactions to the suggestion of a statutory regulator have certainly been strident and at times histrionic. Assistant to the Finkelstein inquiry, Professor Matthew Ricketson, responded in The Age to accusations that “… we would all be living in Stalinist Russia or even Hitler’s Nazi Germany with its Reich Press Chamber if the government acted on this recommendation”. He continued:

Really? What is actually recommended differs from the existing system in only one key aspect, namely government would fund the News Media Council. (Ricketson, 2012).

While he quite rightly took offence at such reactive rants, Ricketson was wrong to suggest that government funding of his proposed News Media Council was the only point of difference from the status quo.

Arms-length government funding of a self-regulator certainly sounds some alarm bells, but there may well be mechanisms to secure its independence, just as the ABC is publicly funded yet independent. The greater concern is with the body’s ultimate power to refer disobedient media outlets to courts with the distinct possibility they might face fines or a jail term if they continued to disobey the council’s order. Such powers place strong emphasis on the word ‘enforced’ in Finkelstein’s system of ‘enforced self-regulation’ and pushes it a long way towards the full government regulation its critics fear. The proposal would effectively convert ethical codes into laws – ultimately enforceable in the courts.

This has certainly been a long overdue debate in Australia, but it has occurred in a politicised context that has been counter-productive and has undermined the likelihood of the implementation of any of the proposals.  Several academics and small publishers stepped up to give the Finkelstein model their approval (The Conversation, 2012). Labor and Greens applauded it and pushed for its enactment, having demanded such an inquiry in the midst of the News of the World scandal in the UK and continued adverse coverage about them in News Limited publications locally (Kitney et.al, 2012).

Criticism of the recommendations by the larger media groups on free expression grounds were dismissed as a defence of their vested interests. It surprised nobody that News Limited chief executive Kim Williams opposed statutory regulation (Meade and Canning, 2012), but such pigeon-holing of Finkelstein’s serious critics is misplaced. History is littered with examples of politicians withdrawing citizens’ rights to free expression because they did not like what they had been saying about them at a particular moment in history.

And, while the concerns of the Left at Murdoch media treatment might have helped trigger the inquiries, despite public protestations against the proposals by Opposition figures (Kerr, 2012), it is questionable whether a Conservative government would act to dismantle a new statutory regulator and its ‘independence’ could well be tested. The Howard conservative government lacked an impressive free expression record. It famously appointed arch conservatives to the ‘independent’ ABC board, ramped up anti-terror laws and cynically exploited exemptions to freedom of information requests. That government’s foreign minister, Alexander Downer, confessed to newspaper publishers in 2006: “Freedom of information always seems a great idea when you are in Opposition but less so when you are in Government” (McNicoll, 2006).

The Australian Press Council – with a suitable name change – could become an effective pan-media self-regulator and fulfil similar functions to the one proposed by the Convergence Review. That review’s suggestion of encouraging membership with the carrot of consumer law exemptions is also a mechanism worth considering.

A uniform code of practice across all news media is a vital reform. It is essential that media outlets and journalists conform to ethical codes. It is in their interests that they do so, because it is these very ethical standards that distinguish them from the many new voices seeking audiences in the new media environment. But Australia has a confusing array of self-regulatory and co-regulatory documents guiding ethical standards of journalists and their outlets. No single journalist could possibly be expected to understand and operate effectively within deadline, paying heed to all that might apply to him or her, including the MEAA Code of Ethics, an in-house code, an industry code and the related laws and formal regulations that might apply.

This moots strongly for a single code of ethics applying to journalists and their employers across all media, similar to the existing MEAA Code of Ethics, addressing fundamental principles of truth, accuracy, verification, attribution, transparency, honesty, respect, equity, fairness, independence, originality and integrity, with exceptions only for matters of substantial legitimate public concern. Of course, this could be supplemented by industry or workplace ‘information and guidance’ documents to help explain to journalists and editors the fact scenarios and precedents applying to a particular medium or specialty, along the lines of the Australian Press Council’s guidance releases. As Ricketson (2012) has suggested, media outlets need to be more pro-active in developing better in-house processes for assessing ethical decisions and in explaining those decisions to their audiences. All reforms will, of course, need to be supplemented with better training of journalists about their rights and responsibilities and broader education of ordinary citizens to raise their level of media literacy.

Australia is rare among Western democracies in that it does not have free expression or media freedom enshrined in its Constitution and no federal bill of rights with such a protection. Other countries like the UK and New Zealand proposing similar regulating mechanisms have free expression as an explicit right informing their jurisprudence. The closest Australia has come to any such protection came in a series of decisions through the 1990s, starting with the Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth and Nationwide News v. Wills cases in 1992, where the High Court introduced and developed a so-called “implied freedom to communicate on matters of politics and government”. The court held this principle was fundamental to the system of representative government, but it demonstrated recently in Wotton v. Queensland (2011) that it was in no rush to progress this implied freedom. The Australian Capital Territory and Victoria have enacted limited charters of rights in the form of human rights acts, both of which enshrine free expression at the state and territory level, but neither applies to other jurisdictions and each is problematic even in its application in to its own jurisdiction (Pearson and Polden, 2011, pp. 38-39).

The lack of any formal written guarantee of a free media makes proposals for statutory regulators even more of a threat to democracy in Australia than in most comparable nations and this fact did not appear to weigh heavily enough with the architects of the Finkelstein report or those who rushed to support it. ‘Enforced self-regulation’ is not a suitable solution – at least not until free expression earns stronger protection from a more enthusiastic High Court or in a national bill of rights. Stronger self-regulation with the carrot of consumer law exemptions for compliant media outlets would strike the appropriate balance of freedoms and responsibilities in the interim.

© Mark Pearson 2012

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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Sub judice – time to brush up on your Latin

By MARK PEARSON

The arrest and court appearance of a man accused of the rape and murder of Melbourne ABC staffer Jill Meagher has sparked a spate of commentary on social media – much of it potentially prejudicial to the suspect’s upcoming trial. Here is an excerpt from my new book  – Blogging and Tweeting Without Getting Sued: A global guide to the law for anyone writing online (Allen & Unwin, 2012) – explaining the basic principles of sub judice contempt for lay users of social media. See also Julie Posetti’s innovative and useful Storify on this.

Victoria Police are also struggling to cope with prejudicial comments about the accused on their Facebook site. See my earlier blog on similar problems with the Queensland Police Facebook page where they have faced similar challenges trying to moderate prejudicial comments.

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Sub judice – time to brush up on your Latin

The most frustrating area of contempt law for the traditional media has been sub judice contempt – publishing prejudicial material that might reduce the chance of a fair trial. First Amendment rights in the US have given the media immunity in recent times, but ‘trial by media’ can prompt a mistrial and lawyers can be disciplined if they make prejudicial statements during a trial. ‘Sub judice’ comes from the Latin meaning ‘under justice’ and has been prosecuted most often in the UK and Commonwealth countries, although some European countries like Denmark have laws against publications that might seriously damage a trial.

In 2011, the judge presiding over the trial of a conservative politician for a false expenses claim in Britain referred to the Attorney-General a potentially prejudicial tweet about the case by a rival politician. High-profile Labour peer Lord Sugar tweeted to his 300,000 followers on the second day of the trial: “Lord Taylor, Tory Peer in court on expenses fiddle. Wonder if he will get off in comparison to Labour MPs who were sent to jail?” The Telegraph quoted Justice Saunders saying: “I was concerned that if seen by a juror it might influence their approach to the case… I reported the matter to the Attorney-General not for the purpose of taking any action against Lord Sugar but to investigate whether entries on Twitter sites … posed a risk of prejudicing the fairness of a trial, and if so whether there were steps which could be taken to minimise that risk.”

International media law firm Taylor Wessing revealed in 2011 that they had defend a website against contempt allegations over prejudicial user-generated posts on a message board just a few weeks before a criminal fraud trial. They had to take down the messages and the jury had to be warned not to do Internet research. They pointed out that bloggers and social media users were liable for their publications even when they did not intend to damage a trial. From the moment someone has been arrested in a criminal case, reports about the matter are seriously limited in many countries. Authorities can prosecute for this kind of contempt if there is a ‘substantial risk’ that justice will be prejudiced in the case.

While the mainstream media are the most common targets of such actions, the size of the audience for many blogs and social media commentators will increasingly make them vulnerable. The Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office advises websites to take down materials related to an upcoming case in the lead-up to a trial. The most sensitive material is anything implying the guilt or innocence of the accused, confessions, photo identification of the accused, and republishing reports of earlier hearings. A public interest defence might be available for publication of material on a matter of overwhelming public importance, but you should never rely upon this defence without legal advice.

Blogging and Tweeting Without Getting Sued: A global guide to the law for anyone writing online is now available in print and ebook formats worldwide.

[Media: For review copies please contact publicity@allenandunwin.com or call +61 2 8425 0146]

© Mark Pearson 2012

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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