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The courts and social media: what do judges and court workers think?

By MARK PEARSON

Another article by our collaborative Courts and Social Media research team has been published – this time in the Judicial Officers’ Bulletin (Published by the Judicial Commission of NSW).

A hearty thanks to my colleagues – Patrick, Jane, Sharon and Anne – for your collaboration! It is a team of academics from four universities – Bond, Griffith, Monash and Edith Cowan – proving that worthwhile research can defy institutional and geographic boundaries.

The citation is:

Keyzer, P., Johnston, J., Pearson, M., Rodrick, S. and Wallace, A. (2013). ‘The courts and social media: what do judges and court workers think?’ Judicial Officers’ Bulletin, 25 (6). July 2013: 47-51.

JudicialArticleThe full pdf of the article can be viewed here at the site of the Centre for Law, Governance and Public Policy at Bond University, but here is the introduction to give you a taste for it:

“Social media” is a collective term for a group of internet-based applications that allow users to create, organise and distribute messages, pictures and audio-visual content.[1]  Generally speaking, social media is characterised by its accessibility, participatory culture and interactivity.[2]  Social media can be “two way” (allowing conversations characterised by varying degrees of publicity, depending on the privacy settings selected by the contributor) or “one way” (allowing publication of information, but not permitting comment).[3]

Social media have created intense challenges for the law and judicial administration.[4] Traditionally, the courts have employed the law of sub judice contempt  to prevent prejudicial publicity, to protect the right to a fair trial, and to ensure the due administration of justice. Courts also have the option of making non-publication orders about cases.[5]  However, social media applications have dramatically increased the number of people who can publish material about court cases.[6]  Many of these “citizen journalists” are unaware of the legal rules that restrict what they can publish.[7]

At the same time, social media have created unprecedented opportunities for the courts to engage with journalists and the wider community.[8]

This article reports on the findings of a small research project conducted in February 2013 with 62 judges, magistrates, tribunal members, court workers, court public information officers and academics working in the field of judicial administration.  We acknowledge that there were no journalists present, and our findings therefore are skewed towards the legal profession. However, so far as we are aware, this is the first attempt to gauge the opinions of some key stakeholders on the issues in this area.  We intend to follow up this pilot project with more research to build on our findings.

After describing our research methodology, we outline the findings and offer our brief reflections.


[1]                 T Bathurst, “Social media: The end of civilisation?” The Warrane Lecture, 21 November 2012, UNSW, Sydney, p 7; A Kaplan and M Haenlein, “Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of social media” (2010) 53(1) Business Horizons 61.

[2]                 P Keyzer, J Johnston, G Holland, M Pearson, S Rodrick and A Wallace, Juries and Social Media, Centre for Law, Governance and Public Policy,  a report commissioned by the Victorian Department of Justice on behalf of the Standing Council on Law and Justice, 16 April 2013, [1.2], <www.sclj.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/sclj/documents/pdf/juries%20and%20social%20media%20-%20final.pdf> accessed 20 June 2013.

[3]                 Privacy Victoria, “Social Networking, Information Sheet 04.11, September 2011, at <www.privacy.vic.gov.au/domino/privacyvic/web2.nsf/files/social-networking/$file/info_sheet_04_11.pdf> accessed 20 June 2013.

[4]                 For a discussion of these challenges, see: M Pearson, Blogging and Tweeting Without Getting Sued, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2012; P Keyzer, J Johnston and M Pearson, (eds), The Courts and the Media: Challenges in the Era of Digital and Social Media, Halstead Press, Sydney, 2012.

[5]                 D Butler and S Rodrick, Australian Media Law, 4th edn, Thomson Reuters, Australia, 2011, ch 6.  There is also an increasing tendency of courts to make general non-publication orders rather than rely on people knowing and complying with the common law of sub judice contempt. In other words, courts are prohibiting by specific order what would be prohibited by contempt laws anyway.

[6]                 Juries and Social Media, above,  n 7, at [2.3].

[7]                 ibid.

[8]                 J Johnston, “Courts’ New Visibility 2.0”, in Keyzer, Johnston and Pearson, (eds), The Courts and the Media: Challenges in the Era of Digital and Social Media, above, n 9.

© Mark Pearson 2013

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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Media law basics for election bloggers

By MARK PEARSON

[This blog was first published on the citizen journalism election site No Fibs, edited by Margo Kingston.]

Countless laws might apply to the serious blogger and citizen journalist because Web 2.0 communications transcend borders into places where expression is far from free.  

Even in Australia there are nine jurisdictions with a complex array of laws affecting writers and online publishers, including defamation, contempt, confidentiality, discrimination, privacy, intellectual property and national security.

If you plan on taking the ‘publish and be damned’ approach coined by the Duke of Wellington in 1824, then you might also take the advice of Tex Perkins from The Cruel Sea in 1995: “Better get a lawyer, son. Better get a real good one.”

(A quick disclaimer: My words here do not constitute legal advice. I’m not a lawyer.)

The problem is that most bloggers can’t afford legal advice and certainly don’t have the luxury of in-house counsel afforded to journalists still working for legacy media.

So if you’re going to pack a punch in your writing you at least need a basic grasp of the main areas of the law, including the risks involved and the defences available to you.

Defamation remains the most common concern of serious writers and commentators because blog posts so often risk damage to someone’s reputation – but it does have some useful defences.

Political commentary has been much livelier over the past two decades since the High Court handed down a series of decisions conveying upon all citizens a freedom to communicate on matters of politics and government.

However, it is still refining its own decisions on the way this affects political defamation, and most of us aren’t as fortunate as Darryl Kerrigan in The Castle – we don’t all befriend a QC willing to run our High Court appeal pro bono.

That leaves us trying to work within the core defamation defences of truth and ‘honest opinion’ (also known as ‘fair comment’). (Of course there is also the defence protecting a fair and accurate report of court, parliament and other public occasions if you are engaging in straight reporting of such a major case or debate and a range of other less common defences).

Truth as a defence has its challenges because you need admissible evidence to prove the truth of defamatory facts you are stating – and you also need evidence of defamatory meanings that might be read into your words (known as ‘imputations’).

That can be difficult. You might have the photograph of a shonky developer handing a politician some cash – but you’d need more evidence than that to prove she is corrupt.

Serious allegations like these need to be legalled.

Harsh criticism of public figures can usually be protected by the defence of honest opinion or fair comment if you review the criteria carefully each time you blog.

This defence is based on the idea that anyone who has a public role or who puts their work out into a public forum should expect it to be criticised and even lampooned by others.

To earn it you will normally need to ensure that the target of your critique is indeed in the public domain. This covers criticism of such things as the quality and service of hotels and restaurants; reviews of creative works like music, books and artworks; critiques of sports and entertainment performances; and reflections on the role and statements of politicians and other public officials.

Your defamatory material needs to be your honest opinion, based upon provable facts stated in the material.

While facts might be provable, you obviously can’t prove the truth or falsity of opinions themselves, which are much more subjective in their nature.

As I explain in Blogging and Tweeting Without Getting Sued (Allen & Unwin, 2012) the law will not allow you to parade a fact as an opinion. For example, you could not write “In my opinion, Jones is a rapist and the judge must be demented”. In such a case, the court would view both allegations as statements of fact, and you would need to prove the truth of each. However, if you had drawn on provable facts to prove Jones had indeed committed serious sexual offences and had just been convicted of rape, you might write your honest opinion.

You might write something like: “The one year jail sentence Jones received for this rape is grossly inadequate. It is hard to imagine how someone who has caused such damage to this woman will walk free in just 12 months. Judge Brown’s sentencing decision is mind-boggling and out of all proportion to sentences by other judges for similar crimes. His appointment is up for renewal in February and, if this sentence is any indication, it is high time he retired.” This way you can express a very strong opinion within the bounds of this defence as long as you are basing your comments on a foundation of provable facts.

That is not to say that you can just say what you like and just add the clause ‘This is just my opinion’. The defence will succeed only where the opinion clearly is an opinion, rather than a statement of fact.

It must be based on true (provable with evidence) facts or absolutely privileged material (for example, parliamentary debate) stated or adequately referred to in the publication.

It must be an honestly held opinion, the subject to which it relates matter must be in the public domain or a matter of public interest, and the comment must be fair (not neces­sarily balanced, but an opinion which could be held, based on the stated facts).

Matters like the private conduct of a public official do not earn the defence unless the conduct affects the official’s fitness for office.

If the facts on which the opinion is based are not provable as true or not protected in some other way, you stand to lose the case. The facts or privileged material on which the opinion is based should normally appear in our piece, so the audience can see clearly where the opinion has originated and judge for themselves whether they agree or disagree with it. They can also be based on matters of ‘notoriety’, not expressed in the publication, although it is safer to include them.

The defence is defeated by malice or a lack of good faith, so forget it if you’re a disgruntled former staffer trying to take revenge on your old boss.

Do all that and you can give that pollie the serve they deserve.

Fail to do it and you could lose your house and savings.

On a brighter note, the Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance offers its freelance members professional indemnity and public liability insurance. See the details here.

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Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

© Mark Pearson 2013

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Shield laws might not protect bloggers and citizen journalists

By MARK PEARSON

Q: When is a journalist not a journalist? A: When trying to earn a shield law privilege.

Sadly, that is too often the situation for those using confidential sources for their online reportage, even when it is exposing serious wrongdoing.

So-called ‘shield laws’ are limited protections offered to journalists trying to keep their sources confidential. But, even in the US, they are even more restricted when it comes to bloggers, ‘citizen journalists’ and social media users.

Shield laws vary widely in their scope, sometimes only applying to material that has already been ‘published’ and sometimes specifically naming ‘journalists’ and ‘news media’ as those protected.

Federal shield laws introduced in Australia in 2011 extended to bloggers and tweeters – but only to those ‘engaged and active in the publication of news’.

Some US state shield laws can be interpreted to cover new media users, while others are narrowly construed to apply to journalists in the mainstream media. Montana’s shield laws were held to apply to anonymous Internet commenters in 2008 when a former political candidate launched a defamation action over material on the Billings Gazette’s site.

But a blogger who was sued for defamation over comments on a message board failed to win protection under the New Jersey shield law in 2011. The former Citizen Media Law Project’s Justin Silverman  developed a useful state-by-state analysis of shield laws for bloggers.

The application of Californian shield laws to bloggers was questioned in 2010 when Gizmodo gadget blog editor Jason Chen appeared in a video on the site displaying a prototype of an Apple iPhone 4G which had been lost then purchased by an intermediary for about $5000. Police seized six computers and other items from Chen’s home. But the matter was not tested when charges against Chen were not pursued.

There were calls for a US federal shield law after travel bloggers Chris Elliott and Steve Frischling were subpoenaed in late 2009 to find the anonymous correspondent who had provided them with a Transportation Security Administration security directive they had posted after a failed terrorist attack. But the TSA backed off and withdrew its demands. 

The waters get murkier as the traditional media contract throughout the developed world and continue to retrench journalists, with many then turning to the Web and social media to continue their work. Some can only do it part-time and may not be defined as  ‘engaged and active in the publication of news’. The same goes for students who often produce excellent investigative journalism but are not yet doing it for a living. It is debatable whether they would earn the protection of shield laws under many definitions.

And then there is the serious blogger with an agenda – not meeting the usual definition of ‘journalist’ and perhaps even rejecting the term. Nevertheless, should such an individual’s claim to a shield law privilege be allowed? Policy makers in most jurisdictions think not.

What do you think? I welcome your comments below.

Parts of this blog have been excerpted from my recent book Blogging and Tweeting Without Getting Sued: A global guide to the law for anyone writing online (Allen & Unwin, 2012).

© Mark Pearson 2013

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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‘Mindful journalism’ – introducing a new ethical framework for reporting

By MARK PEARSON

This is an abridged version of the conference paper I presented to the Media, Religion and Culture division of the International Association for Media and Communication Research Conference, Dublin City University, on Saturday, June 29, 2013.

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This paper explores the possibility of applying the fundamental precepts of one of the world’s major religions to the practice of truth-seeking and truth-telling in the modern era and asks whether that ethical framework is compatible with journalism as a Fourth Estate enterprise. It is not meant to be a theological exposition as I am neither a Buddhist nor an expert in Buddhist philosophy. That said, no academic paper topic like this arises in a vacuum, so I must first explain the personal and professional context from which this issue has arisen over four decades and has intensified in recent years. Most of my academic work has been in the field of media law – and its focus has been mainly upon the practical application of laws and regulations to the work of journalists. From time to time that ventures into media ethics and regulatory frameworks – the philosophical, self-regulatory and legislative frameworks that inform and relate to any examination of the actual laws impacting upon journalists.

Professional ethical codes are not religious treatises, and neither were holy scriptures spoken or written as codes of practice for any particular occupation. This paper attempts to do neither. Rather, it sets out to explore whether the foundational teachings of one religion focused upon living a purer life might inform journalism practice. At some junctures it becomes apparent that some elements of the libertarian model of journalism as we know it might not even be compatible with such principles – particularly if they are interpreted in their narrowest way. The teachings of other religions might also be applied in this way. When you look closely at Christianity (via the Bible), Islam (the Koran), Hinduism (the Bhagavad Gita), Judaism (the Torah) and throuth the Confucian canon you find common moral and ethical principles that we might reasonably expect journalists to follow in their work, including attributes of peace journalism identified by Lynch, (2010, p. 543): oriented towards peace, humanity, truth and solutions.  The Dalai Lama’s recent book – Beyond Religion – Ethics for a Whole World (2011) – explored his vision of how core ethical values might offer a sound moral framework for modern society while accommodating diverse religious views and cultural traditions. It is in that spirit that I explore the possibilities of applying some of Buddhism’s core principles to the secular phenomenon of journalism. It also must be accepted that Buddhist practices like ‘mindfulness’ and meditation have been adopted broadly in Western society in recent decades and have been accepted into the cognitive sciences, albeit in adapted therapeutic ways (Segal et. al, 2012).

We should educate journalists, serious bloggers and citizen journalists to adopt a mindful approach to their news and commentary which requires a reflection upon the implications of their truth-seeking and truth-telling as a routine part of the process. They would be prompted to pause and think carefully about the consequences of their reportage and commentary for the stakeholders involved, including their audiences. Truth-seeking and truth-telling would still be the primary goal, but only after gauging the social good that might come from doing so.  The recent inquiries triggered by poor journalism ethical practices have demonstrated that journalism within the libertarian model appears to have lost its moral compass and we need to explore new ways to recapture this.

The Noble Eightfold Path attributed to the Buddha – Siddhartha Gautama (563 BCE to 483 BCE) – has been chosen here because of the personal reasons listed above, its relative brevity, and the fact that its core elements can be read at a secular level to relate to behavioural – and not exclusively spiritual – guidelines. Gunaratne (2005, p. 35) offered this succinct positioning of the Noble Eightfold Path (or the ‘middle way’) in Buddhist philosophy:

The Buddhist dharma meant the doctrine based on the Four Noble Truths: That suffering exists; that the cause of suffering is thirst, craving, or desire; that a path exists to end suffering; that the Noble Eightfold Path is the path to end suffering. Described as the “middle way,” it specifies the commitment to sila (right speech, action and livelihood), samadhi (right effort, mindfulness, and concentration), and panna (right understanding and thoughts).

It is also fruitful to explore journalism as a practice amidst the first two Noble Truths related to suffering (dukka), and this is possible because they are accommodated within the first step of the Eightfold Path – ‘right views’. The Fourth Noble Truth is also integrative. It states that the Noble Eightfold Path is the means to end suffering. Here we consider its elements as a potential framework for the ethical practice of journalism in this new era.

 

Application of the Noble Eightfold Path to ethical journalism practice

Each of the constituent steps of the Noble Eightfold Path – understanding free of superstition, kindly and truthful speech, right conduct, doing no harm, perseverance, mindfulness and contemplation – has an application to the modern-day practice of truth-seeking and truth-telling – whether that be by a journalist working in a traditional media context, a citizen journalist or a serious blogger reporting and commenting upon news and current affairs. Smith and Novak (2003, p. 39) identified a preliminary step to the Buddha’s Noble Eightfold Path that he saw as a precondition to its pursuit – the practice of ‘right association’. This, they explained, acknowledged the “extent to which we are social animals, influenced at every turn by the ‘companioned example’ of our associates, whose attitudes and values affect us profoundly” (Smith & Novak, 2003, p. 40). For journalists this can apply at a number of levels. There is the selection of a suitable mentor, an ethical colleague who might be available to offer wise counsel in the midst of a workplace dilemma. There is also the need to acknowledge – and resist – the socialization of journalism recruits into the toxic culture of newsrooms with unethical practices (McDevitt et. al, 2002). Further, there is the imperative to reflect upon the potential for the ‘pack mentality’ of reportage that might allow for the combination of peer pressure, competition and poor leadership to influence the core morality of the newsgathering enterprise, as noted by Leveson (2012, p. 732) in his review of the ethical and legal transgressions by London newspaper personnel. Again, there is a great deal more that can be explored on this topic, but we will now concentrate on a journalistic reading of the steps of the Eightfold Path proper. Kalupahana (1976, p. 59) suggests its constituent eight factors represent a digest of “moral virtues together with the processes of concentration and the development of insight”.

1. Right views. Smith and Novak (2003, p. 42) explained that the very first step in the Eightfold Path involved an acceptance of the Four Noble Truths. Suffice it to say that much of what we call ‘news’ – particularly that impacting on audiences through its reportage of change, conflict and consequence – can sit with Smith and Novak’s (2003, p. 33) definition of dukka, namely “the pain that to some degree colors all of finite existence”. Their explanation of the First Noble Truth – that life is suffering – is evident when we view the front page of each morning’s newspaper and each evening’s television news bulletin:

The exact meaning of the First Noble Truth is this: Life (in the condition it has got itself into) is dislocated. Something has gone wrong. It is out of joint. As its pivot is not true, friction (interpersonal conflict) is excessive, movement (creativity) is blocked, and it hurts (Smith & Novak, 2003, p. 34).

This is at once an endorsement of accepted news values and a denial of the very concept of there being anything unusual about change. As Kalupahana (1976, p. 36) explains, a fundamental principle of Buddhism is that all things in the world are at once impermanent (anicca), unsatisfactory (dukkha) and nonsubstantial (anatta). News, too, is about the impermanent and the unsatisfactory. It is premised upon identifying to audiences what has changed most recently, focusing especially on the most unsatisfactory elements of that change. Yet given Buddhism’s premise that all things are subject to change at all times and that happiness is achieved through the acceptance of this, it might well erode the newsworthiness of the latest upsetting accounts of change in the world since we last looked. Yet in some ways this step supports the model of ‘deliberative journalism’ as explained by Romano (2010, p. 11), which encourages reports that are ‘incisive, comprehensive and balanced’, including the insights and contributions of all relevant stakeholders. Most importantly, as Romano suggests:

Journalists would also report on communities as they evaluate potential responses, and then investigate whether and how they have acted upon the resulting decisions (Romano, 2010, p. 11).

Thus, the notion of ‘right views’ can incorporate a contract between the news media and audiences that accepts a level of change at any time, and focuses intention upon deeper explanations of root causes, strategies for coping and potential solutions for those changes prompting the greatest suffering.

2. Right intent. The second ingredient relates to refining and acting upon that very ‘mission’, ‘calling’ or drive to ‘make a difference’ which is the very human motivation for selecting some occupations. For some, it is a religious calling where they feel spiritually drawn to a vocation as a priest, an imam, a rabbi or a monk. But for others it is a secular drive to aid humanity by helping change society in a positive way – a career motivation shared by many teachers, doctors and journalists. It becomes the backbone to one’s professional enterprise. Smith and Novak (2003, p. 42) describe it thus:

People who achieve greatness are almost invariably passionately invested in some one thing. They do a thousand things each day, but behind these stands the one thing they count supreme. When people seek liberation with single-mindedness of this order, they may expect their steps to turn from sliding sandbank scrambles into ground-gripping strides.

In journalism, this might necessitate a change in mindset from bringing news ‘first’ in a competitive sense but ‘best’ and most meaningfully to an audience in a qualitative sense. Of course, it would not be ‘news’ if were not delivered relatively soon after its occurrence, but in this era of instant communication this step reinforces the notion of ‘responsible truth-seeking and truth-telling’ – authoritative and credible news, obtained ethically, and delivered as soon as possible to retain its relevance and utility without losing its veracity.

3. Right speech. This step relates to both truthful and charitable expression and, interpreted narrowly, that second element of ‘charitable expression’ could present a fundamental challenge to the very concept of journalism as we know it. It certainly places serious questions about the celebrity gossip orientation of many news products today. The notion of telling the truth and being accurate lies at the heart of journalism practice and is foremost in most ethical codes internationally. It is an unquestionable truth that, while a single empirical fact might be subject to scientific measurement and verification, any conclusions drawn from the juxtaposition of two provable facts can only constitute what a scientist would call a ‘theory’ and the rest of us might call ‘opinion’. In defamation law, collections of provable facts can indeed create a meaning – known as an ‘imputation’ – that can indeed be damaging to someone’s reputation (Pearson & Polden, 2011, p.217). Thus, it becomes a question of which truths are selected to be told and the ultimate truth of their composite that becomes most relevant.

Smith and Novak (2003, p. 42) suggest falsities and uncharitable speech as indicative of other factors, most notably the ego of the communicator. In journalism, that ego might be fuelled in a host of ways that might encourage the selection of certain facts or the portrayal of an individual in a negative light: political agendas, feeding populist sentiment, peer pressure, and corporate reward. They state:

False witness, idle chatter, gossip, slander, and abuse are to be avoided, not only in their obvious forms, but also in their covert ones. The covert forms – subtle belittling, ‘accidental’ tactlessness, barbed wit – are often more vicious because their motives are veiled (Smith and Novak, 2003, p. 42).

This calls into question the very essence of celebrity journalism for all the obvious reasons. Gossip about the private lives of the rich and famous, titillating facts about their private lives, and barbed commentary in social columns all fail the test of ‘right speech’ and, in their own way, reveal a great deal about the individual purveying them and their employer, discussed further below under ‘right livelihood’. Taken to its extreme, however, much news might be considered ‘uncharitable’ and slanderous about an individual when it is in fact revealing their wrongdoing all calling into question their public actions. If the Eightfold Path ruled out this element of journalism we would have to conclude it was incompatible even with the best of investigative and Fourth Estate journalism. Indeed, many uncomfortable truths must be told even if one is engaging in a form of ‘deliberative journalism’ that might ultimately be for the betterment of society and disenfranchised people. For example, experts in ‘peace journalism’ include a ‘truth orientiation’ as a fundamental ingredient of that approach, and include a determination “to expose self-serving pronouncements and representations on all sides” (Lynch, 2010, p. 543).

4. Right conduct. The fourth step of ‘right conduct’ goes to the core of any moral or ethical code. In fact, it contains the fundamental directives of most religions with its Five Precepts which prohibit killing, theft, lying, being unchaste and intoxicants (Smith and Novak, 2003, p. 44). Many journalists would have problems with the final two, although the impact upon their work would of course vary with individual circumstances. And while many journalists might have joked that they would ‘kill’ for a story, murder is not a common or accepted journalistic tool. However, journalists have often had problems with the elements of theft and lying in their broad and narrow interpretations. The Leveson Report (2012) contains numerous examples of both, and the extension of the notion of ‘theft’ to practices like plagiarism and of ‘lying’ to deception in its many guises have fuelled many adverse adjudications by ethics committees and courts.

Importantly, as Smith and Novak (2003, p. 43) explain, the step of right conduct also involves ‘a call to understand one’s behavior more objectively before trying to improve it’ and ‘to reflect on actions with an eye to the motives that prompted them’. This clearly invokes the strategic approach developed by educationalist Donald Schön, whose research aimed to equip professionals with the ability to make crucial decisions in the midst of practice. Schön (1987, p. 26) coined the expression ‘reflection-in-action’ to describe the ability of the professional to reflect upon some problem in the midst of their daily work.  The approach was adapted to journalism by Sheridan Burns (2013) who advised student journalists:

You need a process for evaluating your decisions because a process, or system, lets you apply your values, loyalties and principles to every new set of circumstances or facts. In this way, your decision making will be fair in choosing the news (p. 76).

Even industry ethical codes can gain wider understanding and acceptance by appealing to fundamental human moral values and not just offering a proscriptive list of prohibited practices. A recent example is the Fairfax Media Code of Conduct (undated) which poses questions employees might ask themselves when faced with ethical dilemmas that might not be addressed specifically in the document, including:

  • Would I be proud of what I have done?
  • Do I think it’s the right thing to do?
  • What will the consequences be for my colleagues, Fairfax, other parties and me?
  • What would be the reaction of my family and friends if they were to find out?
  • What would happen if my conduct was reported in a rival publication?

While this specific approach seems to focus on the potential for shame for a transgressor, it offers an example of a media outlet attempting to encourage its employees to pause and reflect in the midst of an ethical dilemma – what Schön (1987, p. 26) called ‘reflection-in-action’. Such a technique might offer better guidance and might gain more traction if it were founded upon a socially and professionally acceptable moral or ethical scaffold, perhaps the kind of framework we are exploring here.

5. Right living. The Buddha identified certain livelihoods that were incompatible with a morally pure way of living, shaped of course by the cultural mores of his place and time. They included poison peddler, slave trader, prostitute, butcher, brewer, arms maker and tax collector (Smith and Novak, 2003, p. 45). Some of these occupations might remain on his list today – but one can justifiably ask whether journalism would make his list in the aftermath of the revelations of the Leveson Inquiry (2012). That report did, of course, acknowledge the important role journalism should play in a democratic society, so perhaps the Buddha might have just nominated particular sectors of the media for condemnation. For example, the business model based upon celebrity gossip might provide an avenue for escape and relaxation for some consumers, but one has to wonder at the overall public good coming from such an enterprise. Given the very word ‘occupation’ implies work that ‘does indeed occupy most of our waking attention’ (Smith and Novak, 2003, p. 44), we are left to wonder how the engagement in prying, intrusion and rumor-mongering for commercial purposes advances the enterprise of journalism or the personal integrity of an individual journalist who chooses to ply that trade. The same argument applies to the sections of larger media enterprises who might sometimes produce journalism of genuine social value, but on other occasions take a step too far with intrusion or gossip without any public benefit. This is where journalists working in such organisations might apply a mindful approach to individual stories and specific work practices to apply a moral gauge to the actual tasks they are performing in their work and in assessing whether they constitute ‘right living’.

 

6. Right effort. The step of ‘right effort’ was directed by the Buddha in a predominantly spiritual sense – a steady, patient and purposeful path to enlightenment. However, we can also apply such principles to the goal of ethical journalism practice in a secular way. Early career journalists are driven to demonstrate success and sometimes mistake the hurried scoop and kudos of the lead story in their news outlet as an end in itself. There can also be an emphasis on productivity and output at the expense of the traditional hallmarks of quality reportage – attribution and verification. Of course, all news stories could evolve into lengthy theses if they were afforded unlimited timelines and budgets. Commercial imperatives and deadlines demand a certain brevity and frequency of output from all reporters. Both can be achieved with continued attention to the core principle of purposeful reflection upon the ethics of the various daily work tasks and a mindful awareness of the underlying mission – or backbone – of one’s occupational enterprise – striving for the ‘right intent’ of the second step.

Institutional limitations and pressure from editors, reporters and sources will continually threaten a journalist’s commitment to this ethical core, requiring the ‘right effort’ to be maintained at that steady, considered pace through every interview, every story, every working day and ultimately through a full career. As the Dalai Lama wrote in Beyond Religion (2011, p. 142):

The practice of patience guards us against loss of composure and, in doing so, enables us to exercise discernment, even in the heat of difficult situations.

Surely this is a useful attribute for the journalist.

7. Right mindfulness. This is the technique of self-examination that Schön (1987) and Sheridan Burns (2013) might call ‘reflection in action’ and is the step I have selected as central to an application of the Eightfold Path to reportage in the heading for this article – ‘Mindful Journalism’. Effective reflection upon one’s own thoughts and emotions is crucial to a considered review of an ethical dilemma in a newsgathering or publishing context. It is also essential to have gone through such a process if a journalist is later called to account to explain their actions. Many ethical decisions are value-laden and inherently complex. Too often they are portrayed in terms of the ‘public interest’ when the core motivating factor has not been the greater public good but, to the contrary, the ego of an individual journalist or the commercial imperative of a media employer. Again, the Leveson Report (2012) detailed numerous instances where such forces were at play, often to the great detriment to the lives of ordinary citizens.

As Smith and Novak (2003, p. 48) explain, right mindfulness ‘aims at witnessing all mental and physical events, including our emotions, without reacting to them, neither condemning some nor holding on to others’. Buddhists (and many others) adopt mindfulness techniques in the form of meditation practice – sometimes in extended guided retreats. While I have found this practice useful in my own life, I am by no means suggesting journalists adopt the lotus position to meditate in their newsrooms or at the scene of a breaking news event to peacefully contemplate their options. The extent to which individuals might want to set aside time for meditation in their own routines is up to them, but at the very least there is much to be gained from journalists adopting the lay meaning of ‘being mindful’. In other words, journalists might pause briefly for reflection upon the implications of their actions upon others – the people who are the subjects of their stories, other stakeholders who might be affected by the event or issue at hand, the effects upon their own reputations as journalists and the community standing of others, and the public benefits ensuing from this particular truth being told in this way at this time. Most ethical textbooks have flow charts with guidelines for journalists to follow in such situations – but the central question is whether they have an embedded technique for moral self-examination – a practiced mindfulness they can draw upon when a circumstance demands.

There is a special need for journalists to be mindful of the vulnerabilities of some individuals they encounter in their work. Many have studied the interaction between the news media and particular ‘vulnerable groups’, such as people with a disability, those with a mental illness, children, the indigenous, the aged, or those who have undergone a traumatic experience. Our collaborative Australian Research Council Linkage Project on ‘Vulnerability and the News Media’ (Pearson et. al, 2010) reviewed that research and examined how journalists interacted with those who might belong to such a ‘vulnerable group’ or who might simply be ‘vulnerable’ because of the circumstances of the news event. We identified other types of sources who might be vulnerable in the midst or aftermath of a news event involving such a ‘moment of vulnerability’ and assessed the question of ‘informed consent’ to journalistic interviews by such individuals. Ethical journalists are mindful of such potential vulnerabilities and either look for alternative sources or take considered steps to minimise the impact of their reportage.

This concern for others also invokes the notion of compassion for other human beings, a tenet central to the teachings of all major religions, and a hallmark of Buddhism. The Dalai Lama has explained that it is often mistaken for a weakness or passivity, or ‘surrender in the face of wrongdoing or injustice’ (Dalai Lama, 2011, p. 58). If that were the case, then it would be incompatible with Fourth Estate journalism which requires reporters to call to account those who abuse power or rort the system. However, the Dalai Lama explains that true compassion for others requires that sometimes we must do exactly that:

Depending on the context, a failure to respond with strong measures, thereby allowing the aggressors to continue their destructive behaviour, could even make you partially responsible for the harm they continue to inflict (Dalai Lama, 2011, p. 59).

Such an approach is perfectly compatible with the best of foreign correspondence and investigative journalism conducted in the public interest – and is well accommodated within the peace journalism model explained by Lynch (2010, p. 543).

8. Right concentration. Some have compared ‘right concentration’ to being in ‘the zone’ in elite sporting terminology – so focused on the work at hand that there is a distinctive clarity of purpose. Smith and Novak (2003, p. 48) explain that concentration exercises – often attentive to a single-pointed awareness of breathing – are a common prelude to mindfulness exercises during meditation.

Initial attempts at concentration are inevitably shredded by distractions; slowly, however, attention becomes sharper, more stable, more sustained (Smith and Novak, 2003, p. 48).

It is such concentrated attention that is required of consummate professionals in the midst of covering a major news event. It is at this time that top journalists actually enter ‘the zone’ and are able to draw on core ethical values to produce important reportage and commentary within tight deadlines, paying due regard to the impact of their work upon an array of individual stakeholders and to the broader public interest. It is in this moment that it all comes together for the mindful journalist – facts are verified, comments from a range of sources are attributed, competing values are assessed, angles are considered and decided and timing is judged. And it all happens within a cool concentrated focus, sometimes amidst the noise and mayhem of a frantic newsroom or a chaotic news event.

Towards a secular ‘mindful journalism’

This paper does not propose a definitive fix-all solution to the shortcomings in journalism ethics or their regulation. Rather, it is an acknowledgment that the basic teachings of one of the world’s major religions can offer guidance in identifying a common – and secular – moral compass that might inform our journalism practice as technology and globalization place our old ethical models under stress.

Leveson (2012) has identified the key ethical and regulatory challenges facing the British press and Finkelstein (2012) has documented the situation in Australia. One of the problems with emerging citizen journalism and news websites is that their proponents do not necessarily ascribe to traditional journalists’ ethical codes. The journalists’ union in Australia, the Media Alliance, has attempted to bring them into its fold by developing a special “Charter of Excellence and Ethics” and by the end of April already had 12 news websites ascribe to its principles, which included a commitment to the journalists’ Code of Ethics (Alcorn, 2013). This might be a viable solution for those who identify as journalists and seek a union affiliation, but many do not, and in a global and multicultural publishing environment the challenge is to develop models that might be embraced more broadly than a particular national union’s repackaging of a journalists’ code.

I have written previously about the confusion surrounding the litany of ethical codes applying to a single journalist in a single workplace. There is evidence that in many places such codes have failed to work effectively in guiding the ethics of the traditional journalists for whom they were designed, let alone the litany of new hybrids including citizen journalists, bloggers, and the avid users of other emerging news platforms.

My suggestion here is simply that core human moral principles from key religious teachings like the Noble Eightfold Path could form the basis of a more relevant and broadly applicable model for the practice of ‘mindful journalism’.

References

Alcorn, G. (2013, April 29). ‘Want to be a journalist? Bloggers, online media sites invited to sign on to journalism code of ethics’. The Citizen. Retrieved from http://www.thecitizen.org.au/media/want-be-journalist-bloggers-online-media-sites-invited-sign-journalism-code-ethics

Allan, S. (ed). (2010). The Routledge Companion to News and Journalism. Routledge: London.

Dalai Lama, (2011). Beyond Religion – Ethics for a whole world. Rider: London.

Dutt, R. (2010). The Fiji media decree: A push towards collaborative journalism. Pacific Journalism Review, 16(2): 81-98.

Fairfax Media (undated). Fairfax Code of Conduct. Retrieved from http://www.fairfax.com.au/resources/Fairfax_Code_of_Conduct.pdf.

Finkelstein, R. (2012). Report of the independent inquiry into the media and me­dia regulation. Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy: Canberra. Retrieved from http://www.dbcde.gov.au/digital_economy/independent_media_inquiry

Galtung, J. and Ruge, M. (1965). The structure of foreign news: the presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crises in four foreign newspapers. Journal of International Peace Research 1: 64-90.

Gandhi, M.K. (1949). Autobiography: The Story of my Experiments with Truth. Phoenix Press: London.

Grenby, M., Kasinger, M., Patching, R. and Pearson, M. (2009). Girls, girls, girls. A study of the popularity of journalism as a career among female teenagers and its corresponding lack of appeal to young males. Australian Journalism Monographs, vol 11: Centre for Public Culture and Ideas, Griffith University. Retrieved from http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/171991/Australian-Journalism-Monograph-Vol-11-2009-.pdf

Gunaratne, S. (2005). The Dao of the Press. A Humanocentric Theory. Hampton Press: Cresskill, NJ.

Hutchins, R.M. (1947). A Free and Responsible Press. A General Report on Mass Communication: Newspapers, Radio, Motion Pictures, Magazines and Books. [Report of the Commission on Freedom of the Press]. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Kalupahana, David J. (1976) Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis. University Press of Hawaii: Honolulu

Law Commission (NZ) (2013). The news media meets ‘new media’: rights, responsibilities and
 regulation in the digital age. 
(Law Commission report 128). Law Commission: Wellington. Retrieved from http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/project/review-regulatory-gaps-and-new-media/report

Leveson, B. (2012). Report of An Inquiry into the Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press (The Stationery Office, 2012) [Leveson Report]. Retrieved from http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0780/0780.asp

Lynch, J. (2010). Peace journalism. In Allan, S. (ed). The Routledge Companion to News and Journalism. Routledge, London: 542-553.

McDevitt, M., Gassaway, B.M., Perez, FG. (2002), “The making and unmaking of civic journalists: influences of professional socialization”, Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 79(1): 87-100.

McQuail, D. (1987) Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction.Sage Publications: London

Pearson, M. (1988). “I Want to be a Journalist”: a study of cadetships, Australian Journalism Review, January-December, 10: 125-134.

Pearson, M., K. Green, S. Tanner & J. Sykes. (2010). Researching Journalists and Vulnerable Sources – Issues in the Design and Implementation of a National Study In Pasadeos, Y. (ed) Advances in Communication and Mass Media Research. ATINER, Athens: 87-96.

Pearson, M. (2012). The media regulation debate in a democracy lacking a free expression guarantee. Pacific Journalism Review, 18(2): 89-101.

Pearson, M. and Polden, M. (2011). The journalist’s guide to media law, Fourth edition, Allen & Unwin: Sydney.

Robie, D. (2011). Conflict reporting in the South Pacific – Why peace journalism has a chance, The Journal of Pacific Studies, 31(2): 221–240. Retrieved from: http://www.academia.edu/1374720/Conflict_reporting_in_the_South_Pacific_Why_peace_journalism_has_a_chance

Romano, A.R. (Ed.) (2010) International journalism and democracy : civic engagement models from around the world. Routledge:  New York and London.

Rosen, J. (1999). What Are Journalists For? Yale University Press: New Haven, CT.

Rosen, J.. (2003-2013). PressThink – Ghost of Democracy in the Media Machine. Weblog. Retrieved from http://pressthink.org.

Schön, D. (1987) Educating the reflective practitioner. Toward a new design for teaching and learning in the professions. Jossey-Bass: San Francisco.

Segal, Z., Williams, M., Teasdale, J. and Kabat-Zinn, J. (2012). Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy for Depression, Second Edition. Guilford Publications: NY.

Sheridan Burns, L. (2013). Understanding journalism. Second edition. Sage: London.

Siebert, F.S., Peterson, T. & Schramm, W. (1963) Four Theories of the Press. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Smith, H. and Novak, P. (2003) Buddhism : A Concise Introduction. Harper San Francisco: New York.

 

Note: The author acknowledges funding from the Australian Research Council for funding the collaborative ARC Linkage Project LP0989758 (researchers from five universities led by Professor Kerry Green from the University of South Australia) which contributed to this study and to the Griffith University Arts, Education and Law Group for funding to present this paper.

© Mark Pearson 2013

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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When jurors go ‘rogue’ on the Internet and social media …

By MARK PEARSON

The term ‘rogue juror’ has been used widely and pejoratively to describe a range of juror actions running counter to judicial directions to restrict their inquiries and communications about a case to the court room and the jury room.

I was tasked with taking a close look at the phenomenon for our collaborative research project conducted recently to the Standing Council on Law and Justice via the Victorian Attorney-General and drafted a section around the following cases. Our full report – including elaboration on this material – can be viewed here. [Johnston, J., Keyzer, P., Holland, G., Pearson, M., Rodrick, S., and Wallace, A. (2013). Juries and Social Media. A Report Prepared for the Victorian Department of Justice. Centre for Law, Governance and Public Policy, Bond University.]

While all such incidents involve jurors venturing beyond the courtroom in their communications during a trial, not all their actions are prejudicial to a trial and can be viewed on a continuum. At one extreme are serious transgressions such as a juror’s ‘friending’ of the accused on Facebook (as in was A-G v Fraill [2011] EWCA Crim 1570). At the other extreme are actions that still risk being counter-productive, but are far from ‘roguish’ behaviour and may well stem from a desire on the part of jurors to better perform their role. For example, jurors who search the Internet for definitions of terms they have been asked to consider are likely indulging in their normal method of research and inquiry and might consider such actions as fastidious rather than inappropriate. Between these poles on the continuum are a range of behaviours classified and exemplified here through recent cases in Australian and other jurisdictions.

In 2010 Reuters Legal, using data from the Westlaw online research service, compiled a tally of reported US decisions where judges granted a new trial, denied a request for a new trial, or overturned a verdict, in whole or in part, because of juror actions related to the Internet. They identified at least 90 verdicts between 1999 and 2010 challenged over juror Internet misconduct. They counted 21 retrials or overturned verdicts in the 2009-2010 period (Grow, 2010).

The Law Commission (2012) (p. 62) identified at least 18 appeals in the UK since 2005 related to juror misconduct during criminal trials, some of which involved Internet access or social media use. The section below is an attempt to classify these types of cases, with examples, according to their level of potential prejudice to a trial, although this is not a perfect science and experts will inevitably differ in their opinions on this.

Jurors using social media to communicate with parties to the case

The most famous case of this type was A-G v Fraill [2011] EWCA Crim 1570, [2011] 2 Cr App R 21. Joanne Fraill, 40, was sentenced to eight months in jail by London’s High Court in 2011 for exchanging Facebook messages with the accused in a drug trial while she was serving on the jury. She also searched online for information about another defendant while she and the other jurors were still deliberating. All this went against clear instructions from the judge to jurors to stay away from the Internet.

In June 2010, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals granted a new trial to a sheriff’s deputy convicted of corruption, after finding that a juror had contacted the defendant through MySpace. (Grow, 2010).

Jurors commenting on social media during the trial

Harvard’s Digital Media Law Project recorded the case of attorney Frank Russell Wilson who was suspended from the Bar for 45 days for blogging about a burglary trial while serving as a juror. He had failed to disclose to the court that he was a lawyer (California Bar v. Wilson DMLP 1/23/09) .

An erstwhile Californian Superior Court Judge was called for jury duty in a murder case, and proceeded to email 22 fellow judges with progress reports on his experiences.  His first e-mail stated:  “Here I am, livin’ the dream, jury duty with Mugridge [the defense lawyer] and Jenkins [the prosecutor].”  (Sweeney, 2010).

A juror used his smartphone to send eight tweets from an Arkansas case brought by investors against a company manufacturing building materials. He tweeted: “oh and nobody buy Stoam [the building product].  Its bad mojo and they’ll probably cease to exist, now that their wallet is 12 m lighter.” (Sweeney, 2010)

Tweets from the handle @JohnnyCho in 2010 boasted the owner was in a jury pool in Los Angeles Superior Court. He posted: “Guilty! He’s guilty! I can tell!”  He was identified through his Twitter profile to be Johnny Cho, director of communications at a Los Angeles entertainment lighting company. The accused in the case was convicted and the court took no action against Cho (Grow, 2010).

Jurors commenting on blogs or social media after a trial has concluded

In Commonwealth v. Werner  81 Mass. App. Ct. 689 (2012) Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth, February 1, 2012 a variety of juror online behaviours were exhibited, including three jurors friending each other and two jurors posting comments to Facebook about their jury service. One also blogged about the case after the trial. The Appeals Court refused to set aside the conviction on this basis because of overwhelming evidence of the accused’s guilt.

Jurors using social media to seek responses or advice about the case 

A UK juror was dismissed from a child abduction and sexual assault trial after she asked her Facebook ‘friends’ to help her decide on the verdict. “I don’t know which way to go, so I’m holding a poll,” she wrote. This was discovered prior to the jury starting its deliberations  (Sweeney, 2010)

Jurors ‘friending’ each other on Facebook during trial

Retired Circuit Court judge Dennis M. Sweeney told the Maryland State Bar Association of an episode during the political corruption trial of Baltimore Mayor Sheila Dixon, over which he presided in 2009. Five jurors had ‘friended’ each other on Facebook and had mentioned the case in their postings, despite his explicit direction not to use Facebook (Sweeney, 2010). After he admonished them, a young male juror posted on his Facebook page, “F— the Judge.” Judge Sweeney said he asked the juror about the offensive comment and was told: “Hey Judge, that’s just Facebook stuff.” [Westlaw News & Insight website, 2010]

Given it is common behaviour among social media for people to ‘friend’ those with whom they interact in many situations, the challenge is for the courts to distinguish the often close relationships formed during an intense jury trial from other social contexts if they wish to establish juror duty as an exception to this common practice.

Jurors searching the Internet for information on the accused (“Trial by Google”)

The UK Attorney-General used the expression ‘Trial by Google’ in a recent speech to describe jurors’ use of Internet search tools and social media to conduct their independent investigations into a case (Grieve, 2013). He conveyed a dim view of the practice and cited instances where it had resulted in contempt convictions, including Attorney General v Dallas [2012] EWHC 156. There, a female juror was sentenced six months’ jail for contempt of court for conducting research on the Internet, including definitions of the word ‘grievous’ and a newspaper report of an earlier rape allegation against the accused, and had shared this with fellow jurors. The judgment [at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2012/156.html] provides an extended account of how the British courts brief juries about Internet use and manage transgressions.

A US District judge in Florida ordered the search of a former juror’s computer hard drive in 2013 after the juror revealed she had done Internet research each evening while hearing the federal criminal drug trial of reggae star Buju Banton. The order specifically asked whether the following words had been searched: “Pinkerton. Doctrine. Mark. Anthony. Myrie. Buju. Banton. Music. Reggae. Gun. Charge. Guilt. Verdict. Mistrial. Conspiracy. Cocaine. Narcotic. Drug. Possession. Hung. Jury.” The juror had told a newspaper: “I would get in the car, just write my notes down so I could remember, and I would come home and do the research.” (Ryan, 2013)

Jurors searching the Internet to better inform their role

In Benbrika v. The Queen [2010] [2010] VSCA 281(http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2010/281.html) the Victorian Court of Appeal affirmed trial judge’s (Bongiorno, J.) handling of a situation where jurors had used Internet sites including Wikipedia and Reference.com seeking definitions of terms related to the terrorism trial (definitions the judge said were not substantially different from those stated in court). The Appeal court said the trial judge had found that “it was distinctly possible that they had interpreted his directions as meaning that they should not seek information about the case, rather than using the Internet for more general purposes” (at para 199). They noted the important difference between this kind of search and searching for “information that is both inadmissible at trial, and prejudicial to the accused”, which might prompt the discharge of a jury  (at para 214).

However, in the US similar behaviour was enough for a Washington State Superior Court judge to declare a mistrial in a child sex case after a juror admitted researching on the Internet about witness coaching (Hefley, 2012).

Also in the US, Maryland’s Court of Special Appeals, overturned a murder conviction because a juror had searched Wikipedia for the terms “livor mortis” and “algor mortis” on and had taken printouts to the jury room, later discovered by the bailiff.  The juror did not consider the action wrong: “To me that wasn’t research.  It was a definition.” (Sweeney, 2010).

Jurors as citizens engaging in their routine social media behaviour during a trial

As social media becomes a part of everyday life, the courts are encountering the fact that ordinary citizens have adopted a routine use of social media which they carry into the court room. A visitor to the District Court in Sydney used a cellphone to take a photo of a family friend who was sitting in a jury panel – common social behaviour in other public places (Jacobsen, 2011). But she was charged with contempt and was fingerprinted, her phone was seized and she was granted bail but the charge was later dropped and signs were erected in the courthouse warning that no photography was allowed.

[Other cases of inappropriate access by British jurors include the following cited by the Law Commission (2012):  Karakaya [2005] EWCA Crim 346, [2005] 2 Cr App R 5; Smith [2005] EWCA Crim 2028; Hawkins [2005] EWCA Crim 2842; Pink [2006] EWCA Crim 2094; Marshall [2007] EWCA Crim 35, [2007] Criminal Law Review 562; Fuller-Love [2007] EWCA Crim 3414; H [2008] EWCA Crim 3321; Thakrar [2008] EWCA Crim 2359, [2009] Criminal Law Review 357; White [2009] EWCA Crim 1774; Reynolds [2009] EWCA Crim 1801; Richards [2009] EWCA Crim 1256; Gibbon [2009] EWCA Crim 2198; Bassett [2010] EWCA Crim 2453; Thompson [2010] EWCA Crim 1623, [2011] 1 WLR 200; McDonnell [2010] EWCA Crim 2352, [2011] 1 Cr App R 28; Mpelenda [2011] EWCA Crim 1235; Morris [2011] EWCA Crim 3250; Yu [2011] EWCA Crim 2089; Starling [2012] EWCA Crim 743; Gul [2012] EWCA Crim 280, [2012] 3 All ER 83.]

References

Grow, B. (2010, December 8). ‘As jurors go online, US trials go off track.’ Reuters. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/08/internet-jurors-idUSN0816547120101208

Grieve, D. (2013, February 6). ‘Trial by Google? Juries, social media and the Internet. Speech by the Attorney-General at the University of Kent. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/trial-by-google-juries-social-media-and-the-internet

Hefley, D. (December 12, 2012). ‘Juror’s ‘research’ forced mistrial in child rape case’, HeraldNet. Available: http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20121212/NEWS01/712129975?page=single

Jacobsen, G. (2011, September 8). ‘A quick click or two in court lands a young woman in the nick’, Newcastle Herald. Available: http://www.theherald.com.au/story/936338/a-quick-click-or-two-in-court-lands-a-young-woman-in-the-nick/

Johnston, J., Keyzer, P., Holland, G., Pearson, M., Rodrick, S., and Wallace, A. (2013). Juries and Social Media. A Report Prepared for the Victorian Department of Justice. Centre for Law, Governance and Public Policy, Bond University. Available: http://www.sclj.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/sclj/documents/pdf/juries%20and%20social%20media%20-%20final.pdf

Krawitz, M. (2012). ‘Guilty as Tweeted: Jurors using social media inappropriately during the trial process’. Available: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2176634

Law Commission (2012). Consultation Paper No 209 Contempt of Court. Law Commission, London. Available: http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp209_contempt_of_court.pdf

Ryan, P. (2013, March 5). ‘Judge wants to know if Banton juror typed any of these 21 words’. Tampa Bay Times. Available: http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/judge-wants-to-know-if-banton-juror-typed-any-of-these-21-words/2107088

Sweeney, D.M. (2010). ‘The Internet, social media and jury trials: lessons learned from the Dixon trial’. Address to the litigation section of the Maryland State Bar Association, April 29, 2010. Available: http://juries.typepad.com/files/judge-sweeney.doc

© Mark Pearson 2013

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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Seeking PhD and research Masters candidates in journalism and social media law

By MARK PEARSON (@journlaw)

Followers of this blog will be aware that I joined Griffith University earlier this year as Professor of Journalism and Social Media.

I am now fielding expressions of interest from students internationally who might want to pursue a PhD or a Masters degree by research in my field of journalism and social media law, ethics and regulation.

While I am happy to correspond with you via email at my work address m.pearson@griffith.edu.au, the best course of action would be for you to go through the application process via the Griffith website at http://www.griffith.edu.au/higher-degrees-research/how-to-apply. Details on scholarships and their application processes are also available at that link.

I’m very much looking forward to seeing your applications as they work their way through the system.

Be sure to mark them for my supervision and attention: Mark Pearson LLM, PhD, Professor of Journalism and Social Media.

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Surveillance and investigative reporting: How would Deep Throat stay anonymous today?

By MARK PEARSON

We might support shield laws for journalists and bloggers but the actual practicalities of protecting confidential sources are a huge challenge for journalists in the modern era.

It’s of little value having a shield law to excuse a journalist revealing the identity of a whistleblower in court if litigants or government agencies have already been able to detect them using the surveillance regime that is ubiquitous in modern society.

It prompts the serious question: Could the Watergate investigation by the Washington Post three decades ago happen in the modern era? How long would Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward’s White House source ‘Deep Throat’ (senior FBI  official Mark Felt) remain anonymous today?

It would be interesting to hear from Bernstein and Woodward about how they would manage their top secret source in an era of geo-locational tracking, phone and social media e-records, CCTV in private and public spaces, and email logs.

Add to that new technologies like Google Glass and you start to wonder where a journalist could possibly meet in secret with a government source without being caught in the surveillance net.

The volumes of private information held on every citizen by governments and corporations was highlighted in the documentary Erasing David, where the lead character went into hiding and hired some of Britain’s top investigators to try to find him by discovering everything they could about him via public and private files. He found it was impossible to lead a private and anonymous existence in the 21st century.

Our digital trail extends wherever and whenever we conduct business on the Internet. The typical web browser allows countless ‘cookies’ that track many of our online activities. Search engines, app stores, airlines, travel booking agencies and countless other online entities hold all sorts of digital information about us that may or may not be secure or subject to legal discovery in the case of a court action. Some European experts are so concerned about the amount of information about us that is out there and its irretrievable nature that they are proposing a new ‘right to be forgotten’ allowing citizens to have personal data permanently erased.

Law enforcement authorities throughout the world are winning court orders to search suspects’ Internet records. Facebook is a popular hunting ground, with Reuters reporting federal judges in the US had approved more than two dozen applications to retrieve incriminating data from Facebook accounts between 2008 and 2011, leading to several arrests and convictions. The Electronic Frontier Foundation has published a useful online Know Your Rights! guide for US citizens faced with the threat of search and seizure of their devices by law enforcement authorities. EFF attorney Hanni Fakhoury explained the volumes of private information the average citizen holds on their personal devices. “With smart phones, tablet computers, and laptops, we carry around with us an unprecedented amount of sensitive personal information,” Fakhoury said. “That smart phone in your pocket right now could contain email from your doctor or your kid’s teacher, not to mention detailed contact information for all of your friends and family members. Your laptop probably holds even more data — your Internet browsing history, family photo albums, and maybe even things like an electronic copy of your taxes or your employment agreement. This is sensitive data that’s worth protecting from prying eyes.”

Of course, basic password selection and management is a fundamental starting point we often overlook. As the computer experts advise, choose your passwords carefully and change them often. Our laptops and smart devices also have geolocation capability, meaning our very movements can be recorded and abused, a point well explained by the Australian Privacy Foundation. This has serious implications for any meetings or communications we might have with confidential sources for our blogs or reporting.

As the Pew Research Center reported in 2011, more than half of people online had uploaded photos to be shared with others. As facial recognition (‘tagging’) is combined with geolocation capabilities, it means we are leaving a digital footprint via our images. That seem fine when we are just sharing an image with our small circle of friends on Facebook, but our ‘friends’ might choose to download and forward them and, depending on our privacy settings, these photos might well be viewable to the outside world.

Despite  whistleblower protection laws and shield laws, confidential sources face lengthy jail terms in most countries if they reveal state secrets because officials might not agree there was an ethical or public interest in the material being revealed. That was certainly the case with one of the most famous whistleblowers of the modern era – the military analyst Daniel Ellsberg who leaked the sensitive ‘Pentagon Papers’ about the true story of the US involvement in Vietnam to the press in 1971. Despite government efforts to stop the publication of the material, the Supreme Court allowed the New York Times and the Washington Post to go ahead with its release. Ellsberg and a co-accused later faced charges of conspiracy, theft of government property and espionage which were dismissed among allegations of FBI wiretapping.

Bernstein and Woodward operated using document drops at park benches and secluded places, coded phone messages and convoluted taxi rides to face-to-face meetings with Felt. In the modern era it is even harder to protect communications against detection by the authorities so you need to take extraordinary steps if you hope to keep your sources truly confidential. The international whistleblowing organisation Wikileaks became famous for revealing the 21st century equivalent of the Pentagon Papers when it released thousands of secret US government files on the Middle East conflicts and broader diplomatic relations throughout 2010 and 2011.

It reassured sources that its high security encrypted submission system using an electronic drop box protected their identity. US soldier Bradley Manning was arrested in 2010 and held in solitary confinement pending trial over the release of the classified material. CNN interviewed several experts about the spate of similar sites to Wikileaks who warned whistleblowers to examine their protocols very carefully if they wanted their identities to remain secret after the authorities discovered the leaks. Some reserved the right to disclose leakers’ identities if subpoenaed to do so.

Reporters, bloggers and citizen journalists should pay heed to the fact that their colleagues have served jail time throughout the world for either leaking secrets or refusing to name their off-the-record sources in court. Equally important are the measures you take to protect their identities in the first place.

Parts of this blog have been excerpted from my recent book Blogging and Tweeting Without Getting Sued: A global guide to the law for anyone writing online (Allen & Unwin, 2012).

© Mark Pearson 2013

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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Call for uniform shield laws is worth supporting, but not an easy fix

By MARK PEARSON

Five Australian journalists face possible contempt charges for refusing to reveal the identity of their sources in court.

The journalists’ union – the Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance – has quite rightly called for the introduction of uniform shield laws for journalists throughout Australia.

Australia’s attorneys-general managed to reach agreement on uniform defamation laws in 2005, and it is within their power to bring some sanity to the differing shield laws at federal level and in NSW, Victoria and Western Australia.

The laws in the various jurisdiction were well summarised last year by the Queensland Parliamentary Library and Research Service, and WA has passed its shield law since then.

However, as noted in the ABC’s Media Report in March, even a unified system would not necessarily protect reporters because even the most generous shield laws give a discretion to a judge to compel a journalist to answer a question in court if an answer is seen as crucial to the interests of justice.

Three Australian journalists have been jailed and others fined and convicted for refusing to reveal their sources since the early 1990s.

Only one of those cases – that involving Courier-Mail journalist Joe Budd in the midst of a defamation case – might have had a different outcome if such a shield law was in place. The others involved criminal allegations or charges and it is doubtful the presiding judicial officer would have excused a journalist from answering a ‘relevant question’.

Courts throughout the world have long insisted on witnesses answering relevant questions, whether or not they are bound by some professional or ethical obligation of silence.

Lawyers are an exception. Throughout the UK, North America and the Commonwealth a legal professional (attorney-client) privilege protects lawyers from having to reveal to the court prejudicial statements a client might have confided in them. In some places the privilege has been extended to doctor-patient relationships and sometimes to priests whose parishioners who might confess criminal sins to them. Witnesses are excused from answering incriminating questions in court. Sometimes, as in the Australian state of NSW, judges are given a discretion to weigh up all professional confidences against the interests of justice in deciding whether a question must be answered.

Canada allows a promise of confidence to be protected in court if:

–   It originates with a non-disclosure agreement

–   It is essential to the relationship involved

–   The relationship is one that should be fostered ‘in the public good’; and

–   The public interest in protecting the identity of the informant outweighs the public interest at getting at the truth.

It was put to the test in Ontario in 2010, where a National Post newspaper was ordered to produce documents upon which it had based corruption allegations against the prime minister. Despite the newspaper’s claim of a journalist-source confidential relationship, the Supreme Court decided there was no such constitutional right and that a greater public interest lay in pursuing an investigation that the source had actually forged the documents in question.

Several western democratic nations have also introduced so-called ‘shield laws’ to specifically excuse journalists from having to identify their confidential sources in court and sometimes allowing them to refuse to hand up their interview records or other documents. According to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 31 US states and the District of Columbia have shield laws protecting journalists’ confidential relationships with their sources, although several have quite serious limitations.

Britain offered a limited protection for journalists in its Contempt of Court Act 1981. New Zealand’s Evidence Act protects journalists’ sources, but gives the discretion to a judge to override this on public interest grounds.

France amended its 1881 press law in early 2010 to protect the confidentiality of journalists’ sources after pressure from Reporters Without Borders over several violations. This was enough for a Bordeaux appeal court to rule in 2011 that a prosecutor had wrongly allowed two Le Monde newspaper reporters’ phone records to be seized when they were covering a high-profile case involving L’Oréal heiress Liliane Bettencourt.

Yet a tough shield law in another European country was not enough to protect one reporter and blogger. Young Ukrainian journalist Olena Bilozerska had her cameras, computers, phone and other gear seized by police in Kiev despite article 17 of the press law stating ‘journalists may not be arrested or detained in connection with their professional activities and their equipment may not be confiscated’. She was interrogated after posting footage of someone throwing a Molotov cocktail at a building during a protest.

Journalists have been jailed in several countries for refusing to reveal their sources in courts or hand over documents that might break confidences. Between 1984 and 2011, 21 US journalists were jailed under such laws, including video blogger Josh Wolf who was released in 2007 after serving 226 days for refusing to hand over tape of protesters damaging a police car. New York Times journalist Judith Miller served 86 days in prison in 2005 for refusing to tell a grand jury who leaked the identity of CIA operative Valerie Plame to the media. The First Amendment Center features a useful timeline on jailed journalists.

The Committee to Protect Journalists records numerous other cases, including arrests in Ghana, Ethiopia and Kenya.

It is ridiculous that Australia should have so many variations on journalists’ shield laws in an era of cross-border reporting and publishing via a range of media, including the Internet and social media.

As the Media Alliance points out, it is an area of the law in dire need of reform.

The MEAA also supports the petition for reporter Adele Ferguson, who has been subpoenaed by Australia’s richest woman, miner Gina Rinehart, seeking information about Ferguson’s confidential sources. You can add your name here, but read the terms and conditions closely before volunteering a donation, which seems to be directed to change.org to generate further support for the cause online.

Parts of this blog have been excerpted from my recent book Blogging and Tweeting Without Getting Sued: A global guide to the law for anyone writing online (Allen & Unwin, 2012).

© Mark Pearson 2013

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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Tweeting and questioning free expression

By MARK PEARSON

It’s gratifying how well students seem to advance their understanding of free expression issues by tweeting about them and extending their inquiry through deeper questions.

Some months ago I unveiled a new media teaching law aimed to help students update their knowledge while triggering key questions they might explore.

Since then I’ve trialled it with one university class and have redesigned it for my new crop of students this year.

It involves students completing their weekly chapter readings from their text and, firstly, tweeting to the class hashtag (#MLGriff) a recent development in that topic area (perhaps a news story, court case, report or blog). Next, they frame an extension question from their textbook – something they still wonder about after reading the chapter.

Our first topic for the year was Freedom of the Press and more than 100 students came up with some excellent resources and questions for discussion.

Their tweets on new developments can be grouped broadly into:

  • Australian updates (High Court free speech decisions, media regulation push, access to detention centres, and Assange’s rights as an Australian citizen);
  • International updates (Greek and Somali crackdowns, Hong Kong protests, Vietnam and Burmese censorship, Mexican murder of a journalist, British campaign against seditious libel, Turkish PM’s media threats); and
  • Social media implications (YouTube bans, Facebook’s news push, social media as the Fourth Estate, unmasking trolls, cloud censoring and Twitter as a polarising agent.)
  • Some of the students’ questions would make excellent topics for future blogs, while others would need a PhD thesis to explore.

Here is a selection, credited to the students who asked them of course:

–       Why has the Australian Federal Government not codified freedom of the press laws despite the High Court making a number of rulings on the issue over the past 20 years? (Christopher Young)

–       As Australia does not have a bill of rights guaranteeing the protection of free expression, how heavily can journalists rely on government support? (Tiarna Lesa)

–       Although lying is not a crime, should it be protected speech for politicians? (Emma Lasker)

–       In a global community, fuelled by the Internet, is it sustainable or viable for some countries to have greater restrictions on the freedom of the press and freedom of expression than others? (Jessica Payne)

–       Has social media and freedom of speech and the press in Australia given us too much liberty to be opinionated – to the point where it becomes difficult for government to make popular political decisions? (Annabel Rainsford)

–       Do the current laws of freedom of speech cover every aspect of the Internet or social media or should new extensive laws be put into place? (Michelle Roger)

–       With no professional awareness of media law and ethical boundaries, can citizen journalists be treated as harshly in the legal system as qualified journalists? (Michaela Eadie)

–       Does freedom of speech protect victims of crime and their families? (Kristy Hutchinson)

–       Are laws that assist the freedom of the press too lenient in a time where false information can be so easily disseminated and seen as factual? (Simon Eddy)

–       Is popular opinion the difference between freedom of speech and vilification? (Ashley Pearson)

–       In the aftermath of Wikileaks and Julian Assange, how has the public’s perception of freedom of the press changed? (Jacob Blunden)

–       How has each country’s political, cultural and historical background influenced their view on freedom of the press? (Emma Knipe)

–       To what extent does the media influence our thoughts and our ability to make informed decisions ourselves? (Harrison Astbury)

–       What are the legal consequences of cyber-bullying? (Angela Eisentrager)

–       Should Australian politicians be allowed to hide behind parliamentary privilege and not be subject to the same laws as other citizens? (Ranui Harmer)

–       Why does Australia have a higher Press Freedom ranking than the US when America has a Bill of Rights? (Jess Henderson).

I hope you can appreciate how much more animated the discussion was in our tutorials when students had thought so deeply about the issues and the key questions. Their tweets added material for fresh examples for their arguments.

It’s a recipe for deeper learning – for the students and me!

Follow us at #MLGriff as we work through media law topics over the next three months. The next topic is Open Justice and the students’ tweets have started to roll in. Chime in with a comment or example if you have one to share.

[The latest rubric follows. Feel free to borrow or adapt it with due credit.]

 

Media Law (Two hard copies needed at start of lecture/tute each week – one for your reference and one to submit. Not accepted by email, sorry.)

 

Date and topic this week:

Name:  

 
YOUR ORIGINAL TWEET ON THIS WEEK’S TOPIC. Must include insightful comment and/or link to recent case or article on topic. NB. INCLUDE IN TWEET:  #MLGriff @journlaw

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
Criterion Poor Fair Good Excellent
Understanding of chapter readings        
Link to a recent development on this week’s chapter topic        
Clear and simple Tweet, perhaps with a witty twist?

 

       
YOUR ORIGINAL ANALYTICAL EXTENSION QUESTION:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
Criterion Poor Fair Good Excellent
Understanding of chapter readings        
Important extension of inquiry BEYOND those readings        
Clear and simple question structure        
 

Other comments:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total

 

 

%

Example of EXCELLENT question on Defamation: “How has the High Court dealt with the political qualified privilege defence since the textbook was published in 2011?”

Example of POOR question on Defamation: “What is defamation and give an example?”

 

© Mark Pearson 2013

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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Mapping social media use in courts – some text search gems

By MARK PEARSON

A search of the Australasian Legal Information Institute (Austlii) database offers some interesting insights into the use of social media terminology in the courts.

Legal scholars know that an Austlii search is not a flawless indicator, but it remains one of the best tools available to us.

My search on March 2, 2013 reveals the following insights into the Australian courts and the use of social media terminology.

The venerable justices on the High Court have yet to use the terms “social media”, “Facebook” or “Twitter” in a judgement.

However, transcripts of High Court proceedings reveal some gems.

The honour of being the first High Court justice to use social media terminology appears to go (quite appropriately) to then Chief Justice Murray Gleeson who famously asked on May 16, 2008: “Are you responding to the argument that I just mentioned by saying that if these two people had individually decided to post their statements on their respective Facebooks they were perfectly entitled to do so?”

He was querying counsel in State of NSW v. Jackson [2008] HCATrans 193 – a dispute over whether a student teacher’s written statement after a school gym accident could be withheld from release under client legal privilege.

Justice Susan Kiefel was the first to use the word “Twitter” in the High Court – while hearing submissions in the 2011 free political speech case of Wotton v. State of Queensland on August 2, 2011.

Her Honour was questioning how the appellant might seek to communicate his views to the media: “But he could do it by telephone, could even Twitter,” she stated.

The term “social media” was also used by counsel in that case.

The only other case recording related words being spoken before the High Court was the mention of both “Twitter” and “Facebook” by Guy Reynolds SC in David v. Abdishou [2012] HCATrans 253 on October 5, 2012.

It formed part of a query about whether the test of ‘publication’ should remain the same in social media, but the application for leave to appeal was unsuccessful.

It would be a worthwhile research project to examine the frequency of mentions of social media terms across all courts listed in the Austlii database, along with a content analysis of the situations in which they arose.

My preliminary search across all case law databases (courts and tribunals across the nine jurisdictions) revealed 604 mentions of the term “social media”, 75 mentions of “Facebook”, 73 mentions of “Twitter” and 41 mentions of “MySpace”.

The contexts seemed to range widely, including the following:

  • social media material used as evidence in criminal trials and compensation claims
  • applications for injunctions prohibiting the use of social media for a range of reasons (confidentiality, defamation, consumer law, breach of parole conditions etc)
  • orders that certain announcements be posted to social media sites
  • concern about jurors and witnesses viewing social media sites
  • use of social media in the court room.

It is a fascinating field, and I welcome your comments below.

© Mark Pearson 2013

Disclaimer: While I write about media law and ethics, nothing here should be construed as legal advice. I am an academic, not a lawyer. My only advice is that you consult a lawyer before taking any legal risks.

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